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Canadian Pension Plan Fund and the Transition to a Low-carbon Economy

Introduction
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) is one of the world’s largest public pension funds, with $409.5
billion in assets under management as of March 31, 2020. The mandate of the CPP Investment
Board (CPPIB) is to manage the funds of the CPP in the best interests of Canadian Pension
Plan contributors and beneficiaries, and to maximize investment returns without undue risk
of loss. 1 As CPP Investments CEO and President Mark Machin has recently observed, “our
investment mandate and professional governance insulate our decision-making from shortterm distortions and gives us license to help shape the long-term future.” 2 (In 2020, CPPIB
rebranded itself CPP Investments. 3 Since CPPIB is the legal entity with the statutory authority
to manage CPP assets, and since many of the quotes in this report or actions being described
were taken prior to the rebranding, we will continue to use the term CPPIB in those quotes
and in discussing those actions. We will use the term CPP Investments if we are specifically
quoting from the 2020 Annual Report, where CPPIB uses the term CPP Investments, or if we are
specifically referring to actions taken in 2020. Both “CPPIB” and “CPP Investments” refer to the
asset management entity that has the statutory authority to invest CPP assets under the CPP
Investment Board Act.)
The Canada Climate Law Initiative agrees with CEO Mark Machin’s statement: the CPP has the
license, and we would argue the responsibility, to help shape the long-term future in Canada.
CPP Investment’s recognition of this power to shape the future that Canadians will retire into
is missing in most of its public communications, although it often emphasizes the advantages
that accrue to a large, patient-capital investor. We have produced this Report to encourage CPP
Investments to be more focussed on shaping the future we need in Canada. In specific, we urge
CPP Investments to do more to support the transition to a low-carbon economy in Canada,
both for purely financial reasons, and for reasons of intergenerational equity necessary to fulfil
its fiduciary duties.
The context of this discussion is important. It is unlikely that at a portfolio level the CPP Fund’s
holdings in oil, gas, and coal are a substantial percentage of its total holdings. Looking only
at Canada, however, it seems that oil and gas holdings may be disproportionately high; we
have not looked at coal. It also seems that at the same time little is being done to support
the transition to a low-carbon economy in Canada. We are necessarily tentative about those
conclusions because it is not actually possible to know the answer to the questions central to
this inquiry. In particular, CPP Investment’s 2020 Annual Report shows that $63.89 billion was
invested in Canada as of March 31, 2020. 4 In that Annual Report, only about half of that total
investment in Canada is clearly identified—$7.1 of public equity holdings, $1.6 billion of private
equity holdings, $840 million of credit investments, and $20.984 billion of real assets, for a total
of $30.524 billion. No further specific information concerning what those funds are invested in
within those asset classes is clearly provided, although by working through six years of Annual

1

Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, S.C.1997, c.40, §§ 5(b) (“best interests of the contributors and  
beneficiaries”) & 5(c)(“maximum rate of return, without undue risk of loss”).

2

Mark Machin, Perspective: What Matters When Investing for Generations, January 20, 2020, available at https://
www.cppinvestments.com/insights/perspective-what-matters-when-investing-for-generations (last visited
Aug. 21, 2020).

3

CPP Investments Annual Report 2020 (hereinafter “CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report”), p. 51, available at https://www.
cppinvestments.com/the-fund/our-performance/financial-results/annual-results.

4

See CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 17.
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Reports this Report has been able to identify transactions involving six companies in oil, gas,
and associated infrastructure in the real assets division, each of which is described in this
Report. 5 Generally speaking, however, there is no information about how approximately half of
CPP’s invested capital in Canada is being invested, and most of the specific investments are not
disclosed even in asset classes where total investments in Canada are identified.
While there may well be legitimate commercial reasons for being somewhat vague, it leaves
contributors, beneficiaries, and researchers with more questions than answers. Is CPP
Investments supporting the transition to a low carbon economy in any significant way? Is it,
instead, engaging in crude industrial policy, disproportionately supporting the carbon-intensive
resources in Canada that other investors and market actors are recognizing as high-risk, and
leaving? We can see investments supporting the carbon-intensive resources on which Canada’s
economy is currently heavily dependent, and this report discusses those investments. It is not
possible fully to put those investments in context, however, given data limitations. Perhaps in
future years CPP Investments should specifically identify its Canadian investments in oil, gas,
and coal, and associated infrastructure, versus those in the transition, much as companies
subject to provincial securities acts need to disclose material facts. By such disclosure, CPP
Investments would provide material information to its contributors and beneficiaries so they
could evaluate the policy implications of its investments in Canada.
Legitimate questions can be raised about whether CPP Investments should have a role
in supporting the transition, but the flip side of that question is equally true: Should CPP
Investments be making investments that are supporting the Canadian economy as it is now,
resource dependent and inconsistent with the low-carbon economy that is needed, with all the
financial risks that approach entails? We contend that it is time to have a serious discussion of
those questions and the role of a significant public pension fund in its home country.
Our view is that CPP Investments should be, and could be, making a substantial contribution
to Canada’s future economy by supporting new technologies, new companies, and the just
transition to a low-carbon economy. We argue that doing so would be more consistent with its
statutory mandate to manage the assets of the CPP Fund in the best interests of the twentymillion Canadian contributors and beneficiaries than is its current approach. It would also be
more consistent with its common-law fiduciary duties, which require intergenerational equity.
Thus, we urge CPP Investments to fundamentally re-evaluate its role in Canada in order to make
that contribution.
To support our argument, we look first at the context of Canadian government policy regarding
climate change, and the challenge to the Canadian economy that the transition to a low-carbon
economy poses. We then discuss CPP Investments’ stated understanding concerning the need
to incorporate climate change risks and opportunities into its management of the funds of the
CPP. Next, we discuss concerns raised by CPPIB’s public equity investments in oil and gas in
Canada and throughout the world. Then, we describe a number of private investments CPPIB
has made within the last six years in which it has created companies to engage in hydraulic
fracking in Ohio and Colorado, to expand oil sands extraction in Alberta and Saskatchewan,
and to engage in oil development off the coast of Ireland. Together, these public and private
investments give rise to questions about CPPIB’s transition strategy. We conclude by arguing
that these actions are neither in the best interests of beneficiaries and contributors, nor
consistent with the requirements of intergenerational equity that are a constituent part of
pension trustees’ fiduciary obligations, and that they present undue risk of continuing
financial loss.

5

See ibid., at 54.
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I. Policy Context
In December 2015, after years of negotiations pursuant to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the world agreed to binding action to address climate change
in an agreement concluded in Paris. The Paris Agreement commits the world’s countries to
actions designed towards “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and
impacts of climate change…”. 6 The Paris Agreement entered into force as of November 4, 2016,
when countries representing 55% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including Canada,
had ratified the agreement. 7 The Paris Agreement requires each country that has ratified it to
develop goals to reduce their GHG emissions according to nationally determined contributions
(NDCs).
In Canada, government policy to meet Canada’s obligations under the Paris Agreement
is set out in the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, agreed
between the federal government and all of the provinces and territories with the exception of
Saskatchewan in December, 2016. 8 That commitment is to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas
emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. 9 The federal government has now gone further
in its ambitions, tasking the Minister of the Environment and Climate Change as of December,
2019, to “[i]mplement the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change,
while strengthening existing and introducing new greenhouse gas reducing measures to exceed
Canada’s 2030 emissions reduction goal and beginning work so that Canada can achieve netzero emissions by 2050.” 10
Subsequent to the adoption of the Pan-Canadian Framework, the federal government passed
the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act as one part of its implementation of the Pan-Canadian
Framework. This Act provides for a back-stop price of carbon in provinces where the federal
government finds the price does not meet federal benchmarks. A number of provinces have
challenged this Act, 11 and its constitutionality is currently under review by the Supreme Court

6

Paris Agreement, article 2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2015,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (“Article
2(1) (a): Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;”).

7

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement: Status, available at: https://unfccc.
int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification.

8

Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, December 9, 2016, available at https://www.
canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/pan-canadian-framework.html.

9

Ibid.

10

Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, Mandate Letter to Minister of Environment of Climate Change, Dec. 19,
2019, available at https://pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/2019/12/13/minister-environment-and-climate-changemandate-letter.

11

Alberta, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have challenged the constitutionality of the Act in separate judicial
proceedings. Anita Balakrishan, Ontario Files Appeal to SCC in Carbon Tax [sic] Case, LawTimes, 28 Aug. 2019,
available at https://www.lawtimesnews.com/news/general/ontario-files-appeal-to-scc-in-carbon-taxcase/302815.
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of Canada. 12 Still, at this point in 2020, it is federal policy that Canada reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions substantially by 2030, and that will remain its policy even if the backstop price of
carbon is struck down as unconstitutional.
Reducing Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions is not only an obligation for Canada to meet its
obligations under the Paris Agreement. It is necessary to protect Canada’s economy. In 2019
the Bank of Canada for the first time in its Annual Financial System Review discussed climate
change as a vulnerability to both Canada’s economy and financial system. 13 The Financial
System Review stated that:
The move to a low-carbon economy involves complex structural adjustments,
creating new opportunities as well as transition risk. Investor and consumer
preferences are shifting toward lower-carbon sources and production
processes, suggesting that the move to a low-carbon economy is underway.
Transition costs will be felt most in carbon-intensive sectors, such as the oil
and gas sector. If some fossil fuel reserves remain unexploited, assets in this
sector may become stranded, losing much of their value. At the same time,
other sectors such as green technology and alternative energy will likely
benefit.
Both physical and transition risks are likely to have broad impacts on the
economy. Moving labour and capital toward less carbon-intensive sectors is
costly and takes time. Global trade patterns may also shift as production costs
and the value of resources change. The necessary adjustments are complex
and pervasive and might lead to increased risk for the financial system. In
addition to insurance companies, many other parts of the financial system are
exposed to risks from climate change. Banks have loans to carbon-intensive
sectors as well as to connected sectors—for example, those upstream or
downstream in supply chains. Asset managers hold carbon-intensive assets in
and outside Canada. 14
This statement about asset managers holding carbon-intensive assets in and outside Canada
is equally applicable to the Canada Pension Plan Fund, through the stewardship of CPP
Investments. In this Report, we discuss whether and how climate is being considered by CPP
Investments, particularly in some of its private investments establishing companies in the oil
and gas industry, in both Canada and the United States, and exerting managerial authority at
those companies.

12

The Courts of Appeal of both Ontario and Saskatchewan have upheld the Act as within Parliament’s Peace, Order
and good Government power within s. 91 of the Constitutional Act, 1967. Reference re: Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act, [2019] ONCA 544; In the matter of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, [2019] SKCA 40. In contrast,
the Court of Appeal for Alberta found the Act unconstitutional in a split decision. In the matter of the Greenhouse Gas
Pollution Pricing Act [2020] ABCA 74. The Ontario and Saskatchewan opinions are on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada. Hearings in March 2020 at the SCC were delayed due to the COVID 19 shutdown.

13

See Bank of Canada (2019) Annual Financial System Review, Vulnerability 5, Climate Change, available at https://
www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/05/financial-system-review-2019/#Vulnerability-5-Climate-change.

14

Ibid. (emphasis supplied).
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II.

CPP Investments Public Statements about
Climate Change

CPP Investments is a large, complicated, globally-diversified investor, with 15.6% of the
CPP Fund investments in Canada; 35.2% in the United States (US); 25% in Asia; 15.5% in the
European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK), 4% in Latin America, and 3% in Australia. 15
Its investment mix as of March 31, 2020, is: Public market equities, 28.2%; private equities,
24.7%; fixed income, 23.3%; and real assets: 23.8%. 16 The 15.6% of CPP Fund investments
held in Canada is $63.9 billion Canadian dollars, which represents significant potential for
supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Many of CPP Investment’s statements suggest that the serious transition risks to the Canadian
economy from climate change are being appropriately managed. Those transition risks
are acute: 17% of the Canadian GDP in 2018 was tied directly or indirectly to the extraction,
refining, transport and sale of oil, gas, coal; as well as mineral extraction and forestry, the latter
of which contributed 1.4% to GDP. 17 Transitioning away from these GHG-intensive sources of
energy and economic inputs to the Canadian economy over the next decades will have effects
on both producers and consumers; and could disproportionately affect particular provinces
in Canada, notably Alberta, and particular people, such as those who work in the oil, gas, and
coal industries. Thus, as the government has recognized, the transition needs to be carefully
managed, 18 and finance and investment play a key role in that management.
In its policy statements, CPP Investments recognizes the importance of environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) factors in general, and climate change in specific. In its June 2020 Policy
on Sustainable Investing, it sets out its general view that “[o]ver our long investment-horizon,
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors, including climate change, have the
potential to be significant drivers of risks or opportunities to profitability and shareholder value
. . . .” 19 The policy states that CPP Investments “consider(s) and integrate(s) both ESG risks and
opportunities into [its] investment analysis, rather than eliminating investments based on ESG
factors alone.” 20 It also emphasizes its engagement with investee companies on ESG matters,
and its expectation that investee companies will disclose financially material ESG factors in
accordance with the standards established by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
(SASB) and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). 21

15

See CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 11.

16

See ibid., at 10 and 17.

17

Natural Resources Canada, Ten Key Facts on Canada’s Natural Resources, available at https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/
sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/emmc/pdf/2019/2019-KFF-EN.pdf.  

18

See, for instance, Final Report by the Task Force on Just Transition for Canadian Coal Power Workers and
Communities, Dec. 2018, available at https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climatechange/task-force-just-transition/final-report.html.

19

CPP Investments Policy on Sustainable Investing, 2, available at https://cdn2.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/08/CPP Investments-policy-on-sustainable-investing-june-19-2020-en.pdf.

20

Ibid.

21

Ibid. at 3.
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Regarding climate change specifically, CPPIB stated in its 2019 Annual Report that improving
its understanding of opportunities and risks related to climate change was one of its key
operational highlights for fiscal year 2019. It stated that it had:
“Accelerated our work on this issue with the creation of the Climate Change
Program to oversee, guide and support our organizational efforts; delivered a
framework that allows investment teams to efficiently and effectively identify,
assess and price key climate change risks and opportunities that are likely to
have an economic impact on their investments; and produced and published
the first ever carbon footprint of the public equities portfolio, with specific
metrics including total carbon emissions and carbon intensity.” 22
CPP Investments’ engagement with climate change risks and opportunities continued in
fiscal year 2020, as would be expected. Further detail of CPP Investment’s general approach is
provided in a two-page call-out box in the 2020 Annual Report. CPP Investments states that it is
a strong supporter of the TCFD, and expects to fully incorporate that disclosure framework for
its own reporting by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2021. 23 Using TCFD’s framework of governance,
strategy, risk management, metrics and targets, CPP Investments provides details of its climate
change management committee and work with top-management teams; its work streams
to incorporate climate change risks and opportunities into the strategies of various of its
asset divisions; its work to incorporate climate change risk into its general risk management
framework; and its report in 2018 on the carbon footprint of its public equities holdings. 24
Further details on CPP Investments integration and management of climate change risks
and opportunities is also provided in a Climate Change Brochure from late 2019 specifically
discussing climate change and initiatives across the portfolio. 25
Altogether, the descriptions suggest a careful, comprehensive process by which a complex
organization is starting to incorporate climate change risks and opportunities throughout the
organization and within investment teams. That impression is supported by the statement in
its Principles of Sustainability Investing that there is a Sustainable Investing group that “works
across the organization to support investment analysis on the impact of ESG Factors, and
conducts research on industry standards and best practices.” 26 That group has been working
to integrate climate change risk analysis into significant investments, including “close to 100
transactions” in FY 2020, 30 of which entailed further climate change due diligence. 27 Richard
Manley, who is Managing Director and Head of Sustainable Investing, 28 is also listed as part of
CPP Investment’s Leadership Team on its website, although not a part of its Senior Management
Team. There is no information provided on how many people comprise the Sustainable
Investment team, however, or what, precisely, they do to “work to ensure that environmental,
social and governance, including climate risks and opportunities, are incorporated into

22

See Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, Investing for Generations, Annual Report 2019 (“CPPIB 2019 Annual
Report”), 31 available at http://www.cppib.com/documents/2042/CPPIB-ANNUAL-REPORT-2019-ENG.pdf.

23

CPP Inv. Annual Report 2020, supra note 3, at 30-31.

24

Ibid.

25

See CPP Investments, Climate Change Brochure, available at https://cdn3.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/12/Climate_Change_Brochure.pdf.

26

CPP Investments Policy on Sustainable Investing, supra note 39, at 2,

27

CPP Inv. Annual Report 2020, supra note 3, at 78.

28

See Sustainable Investing, available at https://www.cppinvestments.com/about-us/our-investment-teams/
team-active-equities/active-equities-sustainable-investing (access Aug. 25, 2020).
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investment decision-making and asset management.” 29 The charts within the 2019 Climate
Change Brochure do show the Sustainable Investing group as the “Operation Lead and
Champion,” but it is difficult to discern the precise relationship between Sustainable Investing
and the Climate Change Program. 30
Reading its Annual Reports (from 2014 through 2020) and many linked policy statements, it
appears to this author that the CPP is being quite professionally managed. CPP Investments
is obviously serious about its general financial responsibilities to Canadian beneficiaries. It is
at the beginning of incorporating climate risk and opportunities into its analyses and portfolio
development. How thoroughgoing that incorporation really is or will become cannot be
determined from CPP Investments’ reports, however.
Of particular concern, since late 2014, CBBIB has been increasing its investments in the most
carbon-intensive aspects of oil and gas production. There seems to be a troubling inconsistency
–or potential inconsistency--between CPPIB’s general descriptions of climate change risk, and
a number of actual transactions that CPPIB has initiated since 2014 in a division, Energy and
Resources, that is growing rapidly. Moreover, in its discussion of the energy transition in its 2019
Annual Report, CPPIB suggests that continuing to develop oil and gas assets is its transition
strategy. 31 Each of these points will be elaborated upon below.
The Canadian Expert Panel on Sustainable Finance called the role of finance and investment
“critical . . . in supporting the real economy through the transition” to a low-carbon economy.
Whether CPP Investments is supporting that transition in Canada, where $63.89 billion of the
CPP Fund’s investments are held, 32 seems doubtful. It certainly has not articulated supporting
the transition as a goal, nor has it identified specific targets for investments in the transition in
Canada. Rather, a number of CPP Investment’s capital allocations seem to rely on the idea that
Canada and the world will not actually transition to a low-carbon economy in the time frame
scientists have deemed necessary. Unfortunately, as a large, active investor, CPP Investment’s
actions could have the effect of contributing to Canada’s failure to meet its international and
domestic commitments to transition to a low-carbon economy.

29

Ibid.

30

Ibid., at 5-6.

31

See text accompanying notes 58-66, infra.

32

See CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 17.
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III. Questions Arising From the CPP Fund’s
Public Equity Holdings in Oil, Gas, and
Coal
A. Data Gaps in Canadian Public Equity Holdings
CPP Investments is to be commended for listing the CPP Fund’s public equity holdings on its
website so that beneficiaries can be aware of some of its activities in this asset class. That said,
there are significant data gaps. The list of Canadian public equities on CPP Investment’s website
shows a total of $3.137 billion (Canadian) held in this asset class as of March 31, 2020, 33 while
the 2020 Annual Report states that Canadian public equities holdings as of March 31, 2020 were
$7.1 billion. 34 The website does state that holdings being managed externally over which CPP
Investments has no discretionary authority are not included in the list of public holdings, so
that is perhaps part of the explanation for the $3.963 billion of public equity holdings in Canada
that are not identified. There is an additional $5.6 billion of invested capital held in the S&P
50/TSX 60 Index Fund, 35 which is an index fund that is a composite of companies listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange, so that is perhaps where the remainder of the public equity holdings
are, but even then the numbers don’t add up: $3.137 billion of identified holdings from the
list of public equity holdings on the website, plus $5.6 billion of index fund holdings in public
markets in Canada is $8.737 billion of public market holdings in Canada, not the $7.1 billion
stated in the 2020 Annual Report as of March 31, 2020. This inconsistency is part of a larger
problem that recurs throughout this report and previous Annual Reports: the data, although
contained in exhaustive reports, are just not sufficient to fully inform Canadians and other
contributors to CPP (non-Canadians working in Canada) about how their funds are being used.
In any case, the public holdings that are listed on the website suggest a troubling
incrementalism, at best, in CPP Investment’s support for the transition to a low-carbon
economy. We recognize that one of the world’s largest investors cannot signal its intentions
in advance, and so investment decisions supportive of the transition may be underway. We
also recognize that in its Statement of Investment Policies, CPP Investments has emphasized
engagement over divestment, and we have no specific information about what that
engagement entails in the high-carbon oil, gas, and coal sectors. Altogether, however, the public
equity portfolio gives rise to serious questions, notwithstanding these data gaps.

B. A Troubling Incrementalism
An academic analysis by Rowe et al. of the CPP Fund’s public holdings as of March 31, 2019,
both in Canada and globally, found 79 investments in the top 200 publicly-traded global

33

See CPP Investments, Canadian Publicly Traded Equity Holdings, as of March 31, 2020, available at https://cdn2.
cppinvestments.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Canadian-Public-Disclosure_ibfs_06_2020_en.htm.

34

See CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 54.

35

See CPP Investments, Global Equity Index Exposure, available at https://cdn2.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/08/Global-Equity-Index-Exposure_ibfs_en_06_2020.htm.
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companies in oil, gas, and coal, constituting investments in 41% of the world’s largest coal
producers and 38% of the world’s largest oil and gas companies. 36 The authors’ analysis
concluded that these 200 companies have valued reserves of oil, gas, or coal that collectively
comprise four times the world’s extractible fossil fuel assets if we are to stay within 1.5°C
warming above pre-industrial levels. Thus, these fossil fuel reserves are overvalued on
companies’ financial statements, and the stock prices also overvalued, if transition is taken
seriously. 37
The Rowe et al. report concentrates on the CPP Fund’s holdings in the top 200 publicly-traded
companies in the world in oil, gas, and coal. Thus, their report understates this industry
risk to the Fund’s portfolio, since it excludes smaller oil, gas, and coal companies. A more
comprehensive analysis from 2017 found that in addition to the CPP Fund’s $1.2 billion in
investments in 41 large coal producers worldwide, for instance, it had an approximately $ 4
billion more invested in smaller coal companies worldwide. 38 Presumably a similar analysis of
the CPP Fund’s global oil and gas holdings, looking at both smaller companies and associated
infrastructure would be worthwhile to understand the full ambit of the CPP Fund’s exposure to
oil and gas.
Looking more specifically, and only, at its Canadian public equity holdings, it seems that CPP
Investments has made a choice to be over-invested in oil and gas companies. Its S&P 500/TSX
60 investment of $5.6 billion is already an investment that is as substantially exposed to oil and
gas as is the Canadian market generally, given that the sector composition of that index will
match the energy sector composition of the Canadian market. 39 In its non-index investments
in Canadian public equity, as listed as of March 31, 2020, 19.5% of the $3.137 billion listed, or
$605 million of holdings, are in oil and gas companies, including CPP’s three largest public
holdings by number of shares: Canadian Natural Resources, Ltd. (23.695 million shares); Seven
Generations Energy (56.351 million shares); and Torc Oil and Gas (65.187 million shares).
That this over-investment in oil and gas presents financial risks was clear in CPP Investment’s
discussion of its financial results in fiscal year 2020. Discussing the losses in its Canadian public
equities, CPP Investments stated that “[i]n Canada, the decline in oil prices and its impact on
the energy sector contributed to a further deterioration in Canadian equity performance, which
returned -12.2% in the fiscal year.” 40
The financial concern is the cumulative effect of oil, gas, and coal holdings on long-term
investors such as the CPP Fund. 41 Mercer, a consultant to $10 trillion of institutional investors,

36

See James K. Rowe, Steph Glanzmann, Jessica Dempsey and Zoe Yunker, Fossil Fuels: Canada Pension Plan’s
failure to respect the 1.5-degree Celsius limit, Nov. 2019, at 12, available at https://www.policyalternatives.ca/
publications/reports/fossil-futures.pdf.  This author gave comments on an early version of that report.

37

Ibid., at 12-13.

38

See ibid., at 13 & fn. 20, citing Friends of the Earth, “Canadian Coal Investment: Powering Past the Coal Alliance,”
December 2017, available at https://foecanada.org/en/files/2017/12/FoE_PowerPastTheCoalAlliance.pdf

39

See S&P Dow Jones Indices, Overview S&P 500/TSX 60, available at https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/
equity/sp-tsx-60-index/#overview.

40

See CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 53.

41

Some significant percentage of contributors and beneficiaries clearly care about these holdings for reasons well
beyond their financial implications. A recent national poll found that 42% of Canadian adults think climate change
is an emergency; another 20% think it is not yet one but will likely be one in the next few years, and 21% think it is a
serious problem. David Coletto, Abacus Data, Is Climate Change “an Emergency” and do Canadias Support a Madein-Canada Green New Deal?, Aug. 12, 2019, available at https://abacusdata.ca/is-climate-change-an-emergencyand-do-canadians-support-a-made-in-canada-green-new-deal/. Seventy-two percent of those surveyed support
a Canadian green new deal, supporting workers in the transition and with government investing heavily to achieve
its goals. Ibid.   
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published an analysis in 2019 of the risks and opportunities from climate change and from
the transition to a low-carbon economy. 42 It evaluated the effects on various portfolios, such
as a growth portfolio and a sustainable growth portfolio, 43 under three different scenarios:
one showing a 2°C increase in preindustrial temperatures by 2100, which would require
“aggressive” climate action; one a 3°C increase by 2100, which assumes “some climate action
but not transformative”; and the third a 4°C increase by 2100, which is Mercer’s estimate of the
increases to be expected under today’s business-as-usual pathway. 44 Mercer relied on data and
an analysis from Cambridge Econometrics that integrates “the treatment of economics, energy
systems and the environment to capture linkages and feedbacks,” in order to evaluate the
effects of the different scenarios on its model portfolios.
Mercer’s projections showed much stronger risks and opportunities at “an industry-sector level,
with significant variation by scenario.” Under even the most optimistic scenario evaluated,
which assumes the world takes “aggressive” action on climate and limits warming to 2°C
by 2100, the potential effects on a long-term investor of holding oil, gas, and coal, or of not
investing in equities using a sustainability theme, are devastating:
% p.a. to 2030
in 2°C scenario

% cumulative
to 2030 in 2°C
scenario

Coal

-7.1

-58.9

-8.9

-100.0
(by 2041)

Oil and gas

-4.5

-42.1

-8.9

-95.1

Renewables

+6.2

+105.9

+3.3

+177.9

Electric utilities

-4.1

-39.2

-3.3

-65.7

Developed market
equities

0.0

-0.5

-0.2

-5.6

Emerging market
equities

+0.2

+1.8

-0.1

-4.0

All world equities—
sustainability themed

+1.6

+21.2

+0.9

+32.0

Infrastructure

+2.0

+26.4

+1.0

+39.4

Infrastructuresustainability themed

+3.0

+42.3

+1.6

+67.1

Industry or |Asset
Class

% p.a. to 2050
in 2°C scenario

% cumulative
to 2050

Source: Mercer, Investing in a Time of Climate Change, p. 10 (2019) (excerpted).

In its executive summary, Mercer concludes that “[i]nvestors need to consider both climaterelated mitigation and adaptation in an active way to develop climate resilience in their
portfolios,” not only for the financial and societal health of their beneficiaries, but in order
to meet their fiduciary duties. 45 Mercer’s analysis suggests that an active investor such as
CPP Investments, invested in a business-as-usual, diversified equity portfolio that is not
sustainability themed, and with significant oil, gas, and coal holdings, risks “undue loss,” indeed

42

Mercer, Investing in a Time of Climate Change: The Sequel 2019 (2019), available at https://www.mercer.com/ourthinking/wealth/climate-change-the-sequel.html.

43

Ibid., Appendix 1, Portfolio Construction, p. 75.

44

Ibid., Appendix 2, Methodologies, pp. 81-83.

45

Ibid., at 7.
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catastrophic loss in some asset classes, starting to eventuate over the next eleven years. Given
that analysis, and other similar findings, 46 CPP Investments should be asked to explain how
it could be meeting either its statutory mandate, or its fiduciary duties under statutory and
common law, by maintaining its business-as-usual approach to investments in Canadian public
equity. 47 Those questions take on particular urgency regarding CPP’s private investments, the
topic to be taken up next.

46

See, e.g., BNP Paribas Asset Management, Wells, Wires, and Wheels: EROCI (Energy Recovered on Capital
Investment) and the Tough Road Ahead for Oil, Aug. 2019, available at https://docfinder.bnpparibas-am.com/
api/files/1094E5B9-2FAA-47A3-805D-EF65EAD09A7F (calculating EROCI of oil versus renewables over the next
25 years for powering transportation, and finding that the combination of new solar or wind and electric vehicles
will produce 6x to 7x the energy for powering light-duty vehicles, compared with oil powering internal combustion
engines; and further calculating that to be cost competitive over the next twenty-five years oil must be sold at about
$10/barrel).

47

For a full discussion of pension trustees’ fiduciary duties in Canada, see Janis Sarra, Fiduciary Obligations in
Business and Investment: Implications of Climate Change, pp. 43-74, April 2018, available at https://ccli.ouce.
ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Janis-Sarra_Fiduciary-Obligation-in-Business-and-Investment.pdf. Dr.
Sarra is co-principal investigator with this author and others in the Canada Climate Law Initiative, a project of the
Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative (CCLI), initiated by the Sustainable Finance program of the Smith School
of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University.
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IV. CPPIB’s Private Investments and Direct
Ownership Interests
CPP has close to one-quarter of its total holdings –24.7%-- in private equity investments, either
direct ownership investments or as partners with other investors in private equity (PE) firms. 48
In addition, it has 11.3% of its portfolio in real estate investments; 8.6% in infrastructure; and
3.9% together in groups entitled Energy and Resources, and Power and Renewables, which
are two relatively new investment groups. 49 For each of these departments, some transactions
and partners are highlighted on the website, but there is no indication how representative
those highlighted transactions are. 50 Thus, we do not know with much specificity what is
being supported by about 40% of CPP’s funds (Private Equity, 24.7%; Real Estate, 11.3%;
Infrastructure, 8.6%; Energy and Resources and Power and Renewables, 3.9%). 51
That said, a number of these CPP private transactions in Canada and the US are again in oil
and gas, so problematic from the general “business as usual” contours of CPP Investment’s
approach. Transactions being made by the Energy and Resources division are particularly
problematic, in that the purpose of this department is to invest in oil and gas. Moreover, in
describing the Energy and Resources division in its 2019 Annual Report CPPIB first clearly stated
its investment thesis regarding the needed transition to a low-carbon economy. We will first
discuss that thesis. We will then describe two Energy and Resources’ transactions in Canada
substantially supporting the oil sands industry; three in U.S. shale oil fields; and one in natural
gas off the coast of Ireland. These transactions are indicative of the types of transactions the
Energy and Resources division was established to make.
The 2020 Annual Report states that 15 Energy and Resources investments have been made, 52
and the website shows ten companies that Energy and Resources has either established and/
or invested in. 53 We also see important investments in renewable energy projects being made
through the Power and Renewables group, again with some information on the website about
some of those investments. 54 The information on both website pages is inconsistent: sometimes
including CPP’s ownership percentage, sometimes not; sometimes including the amount of the
investment, sometimes not. In at least two instances the amount of the investment stated on
the website differs from the amounts of investments that have been described in prior annual
reports. 55 We can conclude that contributors, beneficiaries and future beneficiaries of CPP need

48

See CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 10.

49

See ibid.

50

See, e.g., Private Equity, available at https://www.cppinvestments.com/the-fund/our-investments/investmentprivate-equity.

51

Real Assets (which includes Real Estate, Infrastructure; Energy and Resources; and Power and Renewables), available
at https://www.cppinvestments.com/the-fund/our-investments/investment-real-assets.

52

See CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 89.

53

See CPP Investments, Our Investments: Real Assets: Energy and Resources, available at https://www.
cppinvestments.com/the-fund/our-investments/investment-real-assets.

54

See CPP Investments, Our Investments: Real Assets: Power and Renewables, available at https://www.
cppinvestments.com/the-fund/our-investments/investment-real-assets.

55

So, for instance, CPP’s investment in Wolf Midstream on the website is stated as “$1.7 billion committed,” visited
September 1, 2020, whereas to date CPP has invested $2.686 billion in Wolf Midstream, a company it created. See
text accompanying notes 136-146, infra. For Crestone Peak Resources, CPP’s investment on the website is listed as
$813 million, whereas the amounts of investment stated in Annual Reports into Crestone, a company CPP created, is
$882 million. See CPPIB 2017 Annual Report, p. 60 and CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, p 89, both available at https://
www.cppinvestments.com/the-fund/our-performance/financial-results.
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much clearer, much more specific information from CPP Investments about the investments
in oil and gas and related infrastructure that it is making, and the relationship of those
investments to its investments in renewable energy. With that information, a proper discussion
of CPPIB’s responsibilities to support the transition to a low-carbon economy can begin.

A. Energy and Resources Group and CPP Investment’s
Transition Thesis
The Energy and Resources Group of CPP Investment is a relatively new, small ($7.3 billion in
assets as of March 31, 2020) investment department. Yet it is growing rapidly, as indicated in the
following chart, based on data in CPPIB’s 2019 Annual Report:
Energy and Resources
Year

Assets under Management
$ billions

2006

0

2011

0.3

2016

1.4

2018

6.1

2019

8.2

Source: CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, page 25.

2006 is the year CPPIB started its active investment program. By March 31, 2020, the assets
under management were down to $7.3 billion, given losses of 23.4% in the group, 56 plus new
investments of $2.2 billion and exchange rate gains of $400 million. 57
It is worth quoting from the description of the Energy and Resources division in the 2019 Annual
Report, Management Discussion and Analysis, since it is here that we first see CPP Investment’s
(then named CPPIB) thesis with respect to the transition to a low-carbon economy:

“Energy & Resources
At year end, the Energy & Resources (E&R) portfolio consisted of 11
investments valued at $8.2 billion compared with $6.1 billion a year earlier.
The growth in the portfolio was driven primarily by $2.8 billion in new
investment activity.
The macro environment during fiscal 2019 contributed to another active year
for E&R. Volatile commodities and capital markets reacted to the increasing
availability of renewable energy, faster adoption rates of electric vehicles and
near-term supply shocks. Policy-makers, industry and investors are

56

See CPP Inv. Annual Report 2020, supra note 3, at 53.

57

Ibid., at 89.
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increasingly re-orienting themselves to a new world order focused on returns
over growth and optimization over speed.
This dynamic created an attractive opportunity for patient and flexible capital
that believes in the following key energy transition themes:
• Energy demand will grow globally;
• The world will decarbonize;
• Energy infrastructure will recalibrate globally; and
• Traditional energy sources will continue to be important.” 58
There are a number of points to make about CPPIB’s views as set out here. First, this paragraph
does not clearly communicate what CPPIB is doing. What does it mean to say that “[p]olicymakers, industry and investors are increasingly re-orienting themselves to a new world
order focused on returns over growth and optimization over speed?” Where will “energy
infrastructure be recalibrated globally”? To the United States, where the shale oil “revolution” is
allegedly “turn[ing] the U.S. into an oil superpower”? 59 Is this the reason why CPP Investments
is increasing its shale oil investments in the U.S. through this department? Will energy
infrastructure be “recalibrated” to Canada’s oil sands? Is this the reason why CPP’s second
largest public equity investment in Canada is in CNRL, a company with significant oil sands
assets? How significant are CPPIB’s investments in those “recalibrations,” and will they help to
frustrate global ambitions to reorient global economies to a low-carbon future?
Second, after having suggested in many places in this Annual Report and others that CPP
Investments is taking climate seriously, we see here what CPP Investment’s transition strategy
is: the world will decarbonize, yes, but “traditional” energy sources (by which it obviously
means oil, gas, and possibly coal) “will continue to be important.” So, this new, rapidly
growing department will buy shale oil assets in the US in the expectation that “patient and
flexible capital” can hang on as the world tries, unsuccessfully (in its apparent view) to fully
decarbonize, at which point its oil and gas assets will become extremely valuable. It will support
the oil sands by providing the funds for critical pipeline infrastructure, collecting facilities, and
controlling-shareholder investments for companies producing condensates to allow bitumen to
move through pipelines (Seventh Generation), and for companies purchasing oil sands assets
as global fossil fuel majors divest (Canada Natural Resources, Ltd.). 60 While these activities may
be claimed to be portfolio diversification, it is not diversification away from the contribution
of those “traditional” resources already to the Canadian economy, 61 nor are these private
company investments diversification away from the CPP Fund’s 20% investments in oil, gas, and
coal in its identified Canadian public equity investments, and nor is it diversification away from
the very real global risks that continued reliance on oil, gas, and coal produce, as evaluated by
Mercer, discussed above.

58

CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, supra note 22, at 83-84, available at https://cdn1.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/04/F2019-annual-report_-june-6-2019-EN.pdf.

59

See Bradley Olson, Rebecca Elliott, and Christopher M. Matthews, “Fracking’s Secret Problem—Oil Wells Aren’t
Producing as Much as Forecast,” (“Fracking’s Secret Problem”), Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 2019, available at https://www.
wsj.com/articles/fracking’s-secret-problemoil-wells-arent-producing-as-much-as-forecast-11546450162.

60

See Rowe et al., supra note 36, at 14 (asserting that CNRL purchased the oil sands assets of Shell Oil as Shell divested
of its oil sands holdings).

61

See supra note 17 and accompanying text (Canadian government sources state that 15.6% of Canada’s economy in
2018 came directly or indirectly from oil, gas, coal, and minerals).
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Third, a serious question arises about the political responsibilities of the ninth largest public
pension fund investor in the world, funded by the Canadian population. As will be shown below,
in at least one of the Energy and Resources department’s investments that we know about,
$607,000 USD were spent in 2018, in Colorado campaign contributions. 62 We think it unlikely
those contributions were from the CPP Fund, since that would be illegal under US federal
law, 63 and we assume that CPPIB would not have risked such liability. Yet, they were made on
behalf of a company that was established by CPPIB, is 95% owned by the CPP Fund, and with
CPPIB, now CPP Investments, employees on the board of directors. 64 The purpose of those
contributions was to try to overcome local opposition and bans on drilling affecting the shale oil
assets in Colorado that the CPP Fund entity had purchased in 2015 from a Canadian company,
Encana, at a time when local resistance to shale oil extraction—fracking—was growing. 65 In how
many other instances has activist investor CPPIB, now CPP Investments, intervened to try to
shape political and regulatory outcomes for the benefit of its oil, gas, and coal investments? As
the over $33 trillion of investors participating in Climate Action 100+ put pressure on traditional
energy companies to encourage reductions in greenhouse gas emissions—a coalition that
does not include CPP Investments66-- how often has the CPP Fund come in to buy shares in
non-transition energy companies, propped up “traditional” sources of energy, and helped to
undermine market pressures and trajectories towards a renewed, low-carbon economy? Can
such an investor as CPP Investments, with the heft of public funds of millions of involuntary
participants, properly use those funds to keep the world on a tragic path, in a situation where
participants cannot divest to show their perspectives on such recalcitrance? These are some of
the serious economic and political questions to which CPPIB’s stated “transition” views, and
investment actions, give rise.

B. Power and Renewables Group
One context that is important to appreciate while considering the question of what
responsibility CPP Investments—or any public pension fund—should have to support
the needed transition to a low-carbon economy is to recognize that CPPIB did create a
separate Power and Renewables department in late 2017, 67 which it has described as “better
position[ing] the Fund to invest in climate change related opportunities.” 68

62

See Daniel Glick, The Story Group, Oh Canada! How a Canadian pension fund is financing drilling along the Front
Range, Mar. 21, 2019, available at https://www.boulderweekly.com/news/oh-canada/. This transaction is
discussed at text accompanying notes 74-107, infra. The Story Group is a project of Conservation Ink, a 501(c)3
nonprofit organization, and specializes in investigative journalism and multi-media projects, particularly covering
environmental and natural resources issues in the Western U.S. See http://thestorygroup.org/about/. Versions of
this article were licensed for publication online in Toronto Now, https://nowtoronto.com/news/fracking-coloradocanada/ and Halifax’s The Coast. https://www.thecoast.ca/halifax/how-your-paycheque-supports-fracking-incolorado/Content?oid=21027311  

63

Ibid. After this report was sent to CPP Investments as a courtesy, CPP Investments stated to this Author that the
$607,000 USD political contribution was from the company in Colorado that CPPIB had established, not from CPP
itself.

64

See text accompanying notes 106-107, infra.

65

Ibid.

66

See Climate Action 100+ website, available at https://climateaction100.wordpress.com/about-us/. As of August
31, 2020, the list of participating investors did not include CPPIB.

67

See CPPIB 2018 Annual Report, 27, available at https://cdn4.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
CPPIB_F2018_Annual_Report_English.pdf.

68

See CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, supra note 22, at 28.
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Data in the Annual Report do show this department is also rapidly growing:
Power and Renewables
Year

Assets under Management
$ billions

2011

0

2016

0.9

2018

2.9

2019

5.1

Source: CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, page 25.

In fiscal year 2020, CPP Investments accelerated its investments in this division, adding $3.5
billion in new investments and $0.1 billion in income from operations in this division, for a total
as of March 31, 2020 of $8.7 billion. 69 These are important investments, including $2.8 billion
invested in Pattern Energy in 2020, which has 28 wind energy facilities in operations in North
America and Japan, and 10 more under development; and $2.25 billion invested in Enbridge
in 2018 to form a joint venture to operate solar and wind energy facilities in Canada and the
United States, and to develop offshore wind in Europe. 70
As with much of CPP Investment’s private investing clarity is lacking, however. The Real
Assets group has $97.6 billion assets under management, and states that 17.3% of that total
is held in utilities, which is $16.88 billion in utilities. 71 Using the information on the Power
and Renewables web page, this Author can identify $6.428 billion in renewable energy
investments. 72 We certainly support CPP Investment’s diversification and investments in
renewables, particularly given the Mercer projections discussed above showing renewables
likely to increase in value by 105.9% by 2030. 73 Yet, these investments are not a sufficient answer
to CPP Investment’s apparent hedging on the global energy transition—and to its actions as an
investor and even in politics that may have the effect of blunting private market signals towards
that transition.
To substantiate our concerns, we now describe six specific CPP Fund investments within
the Energy and Resources group about which transaction details have been given in Annual
Reports.

69

See CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 91.

70

See CPP Investments. Website, Our Investments: Real Assets: Power and Renewables (Pattern Energy), available at
https://www.cppinvestments.com/the-fund/our-investments/investment-real-assets.

71

See CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 87-88.

72

See CPP Investments. Website, Our Investments: Real Assets: Power and Renewables (Pattern Energy), available at
https://www.cppinvestments.com/the-fund/our-investments/investment-real-assets (investments in Cordelia
Power, $740 million; Enbridge, $2.25 billion; Pattern Energy, $2,8 billion; Campanhia Energetica de Sao Paulo, $231
million; and VTRM, Brazil, $157 million).

73

See text accompanying notes 42-46, supra.
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C. Identified Energy and Resources Transactions
1. Formation of Crestone Peak Resources, LLC
A particularly troubling set of circumstances to examine are those surrounding the formation
and activities of Crestone Peak Resources, LLC (“Crestone”), 95% owned by CPP and 5 % owned
by the Broe Group, a Denver-based private company invested in real estate, railroads, logistics,
and oil and gas. 74 Once Crestone was formed, it agreed to purchase the Denver Julesberg
(DJ) Basin shale oil and gas assets in Colorado from Canadian oil and gas energy company
Encana. 75 Originally announced as a $900 million acquisition in October, 2015, 76 by the time the
transaction closed in July of 2016 the purchase price was $609 million. 77 A number of factors
explain the decline: well productivity was 30% less than when the transaction was initially being
negotiated, the price of oil had dropped to $34/barrel, Encana’s stock was down to $5/share,
and local communities’ resistance to shale oil and gas extraction—fracking--was intensifying. 78
In addition to the problems of shale economics, discussed with respect to the EAP/Utica Shale
transaction below, this transaction has two additional problematic features. First, there are
the relationships between Crestone; CPP as the 95% investor that established Crestone; and
individual employees of the Energy and Resources department who designed the transaction
and then ended up sitting on the board of Crestone. But Crestone is not unique in this regard,
as individual employees, including top executives of Energy and Resources and former top
executives of CPPIB itself, have ended up on the board of Crestone, and on the boards of other
private companies that CPPIB has either formed or in which it is a billion-dollar investor. These
board relationships are entirely to be expected in direct investing, but also indicate the extent
to which CPPIB is exercising managerial authority in companies it has established, so cannot be
thought of merely as an investor in those companies. Such relationships also create significant
potential for conflicts of interest, as will be discussed below. Second, Crestone is intervening
in the local and state politics in Colorado in order to protect CPP’s investment in shale oil, even
as citizens in Boulder and Broomfield counties seek to stop Crestone’s fracking close to their
homes, neighborhoods, and schools. We’ll discuss each point in turn.

74

In fact, eight different Crestone Peak Resources Delaware entities have been formed: Crestone Peak Resources
Holdings LLC; Crestone Peak Resources CP Inc.; and Crestone Peak Resources Operating LLC, all formed on
10/5/2015; Crestone Peak Resources LP, formed on 10/6/2015; Crestone Peak Resources LLC, formed on 11/16/2015;
Crestone Peak Resources Management LP, formed on 7/15/2016; Crestone Peak Resources Midstream LLC, formed
on 8/30/2016; and Crestone Peak Resources Acquisition Company LLC, formed on 10/26/2017. See Delaware
Secretary of State Website, Division of Corporations Entity Search, available at https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/
Ecorp/EntitySearch/Status.aspx?i=5838884&d=y.

75

See CPPIB, People. Purpose. Performance, 2016 Annual Report, p. 61, available at http://www.cppib.com/
documents/1355/CPPIB_F2016_Annual_Report_-_ENGLISH_May_19_2016_G0UhjTk.pdf. (announcing Crestone
Peak Resources formation and agreement to purchase DJ Basin shale oil and gas assets). See also CPPIB Press
Release, Canada Pension Plan Investment Board and the Broe Group Sign Agreement to Acquire DJ Basin Oil & Gas
Assets from Encana for US$900 million, October 8, 2015, available at http://www.cppib.com/en/public-media/
headlines/2015/cppib-broe-2015/.

76

Ibid.

77

See CPPIB, Press Release, Canada Pension Plan Investment Board and The Broe Group Complete Acquisition of DJ
Basin Oil & Gas Assets: Acquisition completed through jointly formed entity, Crestone Peak Resources, July 29, 2016.
See also CPPIB, Investing for our Contributors and Beneficiaries, 2017 Annual Report 60, available at https://www.
cppib.com/documents/1591/2017_Annual_Report.pdf.

78

See Glick, supra note 62.

17

Canadian Pension Plan Fund and the Transition to a Low-carbon Economy

A. Crestone Board Relationships
In following the history of Crestone Peak Resources, it becomes clear that there is a certain
coziness about the transaction. Encana was an Alberta-based, Canadian oil and gas corporation
at the time of the transaction. It has now left Canada as its legal home and re-established itself
in the United States under the name Ovintiv. 79 In October 2015, when the transaction between
Encana, CPP (95% owner of purchaser Crestone), and the Broe Group (5% owner) was being
negotiated, the oil and gas industry generally was experiencing financial difficulties caused by
a drop in the price of oil. 80 Encana was losing money, ultimately losing $5.165 billion, or $6.28/
share for the year, and it was determined to dispose of non-core assets. 81
Encana’s interests in disposing of assets that were not its highest-producing, strategic assets,
was met by CPPIB’s interests in expanding its investments in the energy sector. CPPIB thenCEO Mark Wiseman had evaluated the drop in oil prices globally, starting in 2014, as an
opportunity for CPPIB. In an interview with the Globe and Mail in November, 2014, “ Wiseman
said the resulting decline in oil prices will put pressure on some of the less financially sound
energy companies, potentially creating some opportunities for acquisitions.” 82 In that interview
Wiseman focused on opportunities in Western Canada and Canadian energy companies
generally, highlighting CPPIB’s investments in Seven Generations Energy, Ltd.--CPPIB was that
company’s largest shareholder in 2014 when the company went public, as discussed in the
interview--and private company Teine Energy Ltd., where CPPIB is currently a 90% shareholder
on a fully diluted basis, so far as we know. 83 Wiseman was asked in the 2014 interview about
Teine Energy’s decision to “push off its IPO into 2015,” and “declined to comment on the
decision, adding that the pension fund manager is in no rush to monetize that investment.
‘It’s a wonderful position to be in,’ he said,” further explaining that “Canadian producers have
been helped somewhat by the weaker Canadian currency because oil and gas is sold in U.S.
dollars and their costs are largely in Canadian dollars.” 84 Teine Energy has yet to go public as of
August 2020. As will be discussed below, the 90%-owned CPPIB entity is the largest producer in
Saskatchewan’s Viking light oil assets, and a large owner in the Bakken heavy-oil area, having
significantly expanded its acquisitions in both fields with CPPIB’s investments since 2011. 85
Of course, while Canadian producers may have been helped “somewhat” by the weaker
Canadian dollar in 2014, by 2015 oil and gas producers generally were under pressure from
the decline in the price of oil. Encana’s need to buttress its balance sheet led to the transaction
whereby CPPIB’s company, Crestone, agreed to purchase Encana’s shale oil and gas assets
in Colorado —even though at the time the deal was announced, October of 2015, there was

79

See Ovintiv, available at https://www.ovintiv.com/.

80

See Encana’s 2015 Annual report, passim, available at https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/
AnnualReportArchive/e/NYSE_ECA_2015.pdf (discussing challenging environment caused by low price for oil
during 2015).

81

See ibid., at p. 4.

82

See Scott Devau, Canada Pension Plan head sees investment opportunities in oil patch, Globe & Mail (online), Nov.
13, 2014, available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/canada-pension-plan-head-seesinvestment-opportunities-in-oil-patch

83

CPPIB, 2017 Annual Report, p. 60, available at https://www.cppib.com/documents/1591/2017_Annual_Report.
pdf. states that CPPIB was a 90% owner as of March 31, 2017 when the Annual Report was published. We do not
know whether CPPIB has increased its ownership since then, since Teine Energy is not emphasized in the 2018 or
2019 Annual reports.

84

See Deveau, supra note 82, at 2 of 4.

85

See Teine Energy Website, description of operations, available at http:www.teine-energy.com/operations.
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a ban in place in a number of counties where some of Encana’s DJ Basin assets were located,
including Boulder and Broomfield counties, and there was growing local opposition to further
expansion. 86 Avik Dey, Managing Director of Energy and Resources, who had been hired by
CPPIB in 2014, had previously worked for Encana before moving to Houston. 87 We cannot know
if the fact that Encana was a Canadian oil and gas company that was financially struggling at
the time, and a former employer of Avik Dey, the head of Energy and Resources, affected the
willingness of CPPIB to announce a $900 million transaction to buy controversial Encana assets.
What we do know is that having used CPP’s public funds to establish a private company,
Crestone Peak Resources, a number of the CPPIB employees and executives that created the
transaction put themselves on the board of directors, thus exercising managerial authority. The
original three-person board included Avik Dey, currently (and from September of 2014 when
he was hired at CPPIB) Managing Director of Energy and Resources. He was Chair of the Board
of Crestone from its inception in October of 201588 through to June 12, 2018, at which point
he became a regular member of the board. 89 The Crestone Board also included Roger Huang,
a Principal at CPPIB in the Energy and Resources Group, “where he was the Group’s first hire
after inception, helped start the Group’s NYC office, and grow assets under management to $6.1
billion. During this time, he founded and led the investment into Crestone Peak Resources.” 90
As of June 12, 2018, Mr. Huang transitioned to an executive role at Crestone, as Executive Vice
President and Chief Development Officer, leaving the board. 91
Other CPP Investments current employees with positions on Crestone’s board, as identified on
Crestone’s website as of August 31, 2020, include:
David Chambers, who joined the Crestone board in 2018, “currently serves as
Senior Principal with CPPIB in the Energy and Resources group. At CPPIB, Mr.
Chambers oversees many of CPPIB’s direct E&R investments. . . .Mr. Chambers
also serves as a Director on the Board of Teine Energy, Encino Acquisition
Partners, and Nephin Energy.” 92
Waleed Elgohary, who joined the Crestone board in 2018, “joined CPPIB as
Principal, Natural Resources Group.” 93

86

See Glick, supra note 62, at 2.

87

See CPP Investments Leadership Team, available at https://www.cppinvestments.com/about-us/our-leadership/
leadership-team (Avik Dey Bio). When Avik Dey was first hired the division was named Natural Resources. This text
refers to the current name of the division, Energy and Resources, for simplicity.
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Delaware Secretary of State Website, Division of Corporations Entity Search, available at https://icis.corp.delaware.
gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/Status.aspx?i=5838884&d=y, : Crestone Peak Resources Holdings LLC; Crestone Peak
Resources CP Inc.; and Crestone Peak Resources Operating LLC, all formed on 10/5/2015.

89

Crestone Peak Resources, Press Release, Crestone Announces Addition to Executive Team and Changes to Board
of Directors, Denver, June 12, 2018, available at http://www.crestonepeakresources.com/crestone-announcesaddition-to-executive-team-and-changes-to-board-of-directors. The June 12 Press Release indicated that Mr. Dey
was transitioning from being Chairman of the Board “to a role on the Board of Directors.” He has at some time left
that board, since an August 31, 2020 search of Crestone’s website no longer lists him as a member of the board.  
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Crestone Peak Resources, https://www.crestonepeakresources.com/leadership (last visited August 31, 2020).
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Ibid.
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And, we also learn, one of CPPIB’s former top executives is now on the board after retiring from
CPPIB:
Benita Warmbold, who “joined the Crestone Peak Resources Board of
Directors in 2017. Ms. Warmbold brings more than 30 years of strategic
financial and operational experience to Cresone’s board. Before joining the
board, she was the Senior Managing Director and Chief Financial Officer of
CPPIB, where she was responsible for all aspect of finance, risk, performance,
tax, internal, audit and legal.” 94
Crestone Peak Resources is a group of private companies that CPPIB established starting in
October of 2015. 95 As a result, we have no information about how much compensation any of
CPP Investment’s current employees, or its former executive Benita Warmbold, are receiving,
if any, for taking up these positions—although it would be exceedingly odd to sit on a private
company board pro bono. Presumably, current employees’ compensation is directed to CPP
Investments. It is not at all unusual for a large investor to want representation on a board of
directors in which it is invested, and a 95% investor such as CPP would certainly want such
representation. What is concerning here, however, is that the Department which has conceived
of these transactions, structured them, and received whatever management approvals
are necessary at CPP Investments for billion dollar transactions has then put their own top
employees on the boards of the companies they’ve created, or in which they’ve substantially
invested. This exercise of managerial authority at a CPPIB subsidiary puts employees in a
conflict of interest position. Rather than board representation, it would be possible for CPPIB
to protect its investments by requiring certain kinds of regular, very specific disclosure and/or
insisting on certain contractual rights.
i. Conflict of interest concerns
Generally speaking, employees of CPPIB who are also on the board of investee companies have
potentially conflicting fiduciary duties—to CPPIB and to the investee company. Such a potential
conflict was evidenced in the Mark Wiseman interview quoted above, where we learned
that Teine Energy’s planned IPO for 2015 was scuttled, and that CPPIB was not interested in
monetizing its investment—i.e., selling into an IPO—at the time the decision was made. If these
two facts were connected, meaning the CPPIB directors voted against an IPO because it was
not in CPPIB’s interests for there to be an IPO, that would be a breach of loyalty to Teine Energy,
on whose board they sat. Being in a conflict of interest position gives rise to potential loyalty
concerns that many firms would want to address by establishing clear procedures to minimize
those concerns. CPP Investments may have such procedures as well, and we would expect
so. There are no publicly available documents to determine how these positional conflicts are
handled at CPP Investments, although its Code of Conduct does have general provisions on
conflicts of interest and references a more specific conflict of interest policy that is not publicly
available. 96
Other Energy and Resources “notable transactions” where CPPIB/CPP Investments’ employees
ended up with board positions—thus exercising managerial authority-- include Encino
Acquisition Partnership (EAP); Nephin Energy; Teine Energy; and Wolf Midstream. These
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Ibid.

95

See footnote 74, supra.

96

See CPPIB Code of Conduct, April 20, 2020, available at https://cdn3.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/08/CPP Investments-code-of-conduct-april-20-2020-en.pdf.
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transactions and board relationships will be described below. Beyond any conflicts, these
transactions are illustrative of how CPP Investments is using Canadian public resources to both
participate in the “boom” oil and gas economy in the U.S. (Crestone, EAP) , and support the
“bust” oil sands industry in Canada (Teine Energy, Wolf Midstream) and more recently expand
its direct oil and gas ownership outside North America (Nephin Energy).
Avik Dey, who is a Managing Director and Head of Energy and Resources, is identified on CPP
Investments Website as part of its Leadership Team, and member of its Real Assets and Real
Estate Investment Committees. 97 These positions indicate at least two things: Mr. Dey is very
well respected at CPP Investments. Indeed, he seems to be doing exactly what he was hired in
2014 to do: expand CPP Investment’s direct ownership investments in oil and gas and related
industries such as pipelines. Second, these transactions—Crestone Peak Resources, EAP
Acquisitions, Nephin Energy, Teine Energy, Wolf Midstream, and Williams Ohio Valley (the latter
five to be described below), all $500 million to over $ 1 billion in value, will clearly have been
vetted at the highest levels of CPP Investment controls, through a Committee that Mr. Dey sits
on, the Real Assets Investment Committee. What is unclear is how rigorously CPP Investment’s
analysis of climate risk is being applied to these transactions, or will be applied to future
transactions of this sort, given Mr. Dey’s position on the Investment Committee that approves
such transactions, and his remit to expand oil and gas investments.

B. Crestone Peak Resources Political Interventions and Campaign Contributions
Assuming, as we do, that CPP Investments has clear policies on how employees on subsidiary
entities manage potential conflicts, the more concerning issue that the establishment of
Crestone Peak Resources raises is its involvement in Colorado politics, and specifically the
2018 election campaign. As stated above, at the time that CPPIB announced the $900 billion
purchase of shale oil and gas assets from Encana, there was a local ban on new drilling in
Boulder and Broomfield Counties where a number of those assets are located. The legality of
local control over drilling rights was being litigated at the Colorado Supreme Court. 98 Then,
in May of 2016 the Colorado Supreme Court determined that control over drilling rights was
exclusively a state function, invalidating all local control bans. 99 Thus, the transaction to
purchase the Encana assets went forward, announced as having been completed in July 2016,
with an effective date of the transaction of April 1, 2015. 100 So Crestone—owned 95% by CPP—
became the owner of what one industry insider called “’toxic assets’: oil and gas leases located
in controversial territory scattered among housing developments.” 101
Yet, political activity challenging shale oil and gas had continued while the bans were in
place and the case was being litigated to the Colorado Supreme Court, and so “oil and gas
issues figured prominently up and down the ballot, from the governor’s race to several ballot
initiatives” in 2018.
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See CPP Investments Website, Our Leadership Team, Biography .of Avik Dey, available at https://www.
cppinvestments.com/about-us/our-leadership/leadership-team.
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See Glick, supra note 62, at 2.
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Ibid.

100 See CPPIB Press Release, Canada Pension Plan Investment Board and The Broe Group Complete Acquisition of DJ
Basin Oil & Gas Assets, July 29, 2016, available at http://www.cppib.com/en/public-media/headlines/2016/cppibbroe-djbasin-2016/.  
101 See Glick, supra note 62, at 4, citing an “oil and gas engineer (who wishes to remain anonymous for fear his business
would be affected by criticizing the industry).”
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To quote from Daniel Glick’s investigative journalism:
Crestone Peak contributed $607,500 toward the tens of millions of dollars
the industry contributed during Colorado’s last election cycle to support
groups that directly or indirectly opposed Proposition 112, the failed setback
initiative that would have required new oil and gas development to be placed
at least 2,500 feet from homes and schools. Crestone donated to the proindustry group Protect Colorado, which campaigned to defeat Proposition
112, and other political groups supporting Republican state legislature
candidates . . . .$300,000 of those contributions went to a group that
supported Republican candidates for the state senate. 102
Crestone Peak Resources is a group of private companies, so it is impossible to know if the
$607,000 contributed in Colorado to pro-oil and gas development interests came from money
earned in its operations in Colorado, or came directly from CPP resources. It was later confirmed
to this Author that the funds came from Crestone’s operations, not CPPIB. 103 Yet, at the time
these decisions were being made Crestone’s board included senior CPPIB leadership (Avik
Dey, who was Chair of the Board until June 12, 2018), Energy and Resources employees (David
Chambers, Senior Principal and Waleed Elgohary, Principal), and former CPPIB CFO Benita
Warmbold. 104 CPPIB refused to answer investigative journalist Dan Glick’s questions about this
political intervention into Colorado state politics, referring all questions, including questions
about CPPIB’s policies, to Crestone. 105
Presumably this kind of political intervention into another country’s elections, in order to
protect oil and gas interests, is not what many Canadians would expect, or countenance, from
CPPIB at the time, or CPP Investments now. At the least, it is activity incompatible with CPP
Investment’s stated position in its Code of Conduct that “[b]ecause of our public mandate,
we must avoid any appearance of CPPIB favoring or disapproving of a particular political
group, candidate, or political position.” 106 The corporate law answer to this point is that CPP,
as 95% owner, with either three or four of the seven-person board being current or former
CPPIB Managing Directors or other highly-placed employees, is separate from its 95%-owned
company, Crestone Peak Resources. 107 That is a perfectly correct statement of corporate law.

102 Ibid. at 5.
103 That the funds came from Crestone, not the CPP Fund, was confirmed in an e-mail from Jeffrey Hodgson,  Director,
Industry and Stakeholder Affairs, CPPIB, to Prof. Cynthia Williams, Sept. 14, 2020, e-mail on file with the Author.
104 See Crestone Peak Resources, Press Release, Crestone Announces Addition to Executive Team and Changes to Board
of Directors, Denver, June 12, 2018, for information about Mr. Dey, available at http://www.crestonepeakresources.
com/crestone-announces-addition-to-executive-team-and-changes-to-board-of-directors. Crestone’s website
as of August 8, 2019 lists Mr. Chambers and Mr. Elgohary as having joined the board in 2018, but is not specific
about exactly when in 2018. Ms. Warmbold joined the board in 2017 when she retired from CPPIB, according to the
Crestone website.
105 Mr. Glick states in his article that “[t]he CPPIB did not respond to multiple phone messages, email requests for an
interview, or [to] a list of emailed questions sent over the course of more than a month . . .Just before deadline,
Darryl Knynenbelt, CPPIB’s director of global medial relations wrote in an email ‘CPPIB declines to comment.
We refer all questions to Crestone.’”  The questions included specific questions about CPPIB’s policies regarding
contributing to foreign elections. See Glick, supra 62, at 6.
106 CPP Investments, Code of Conduct, § 2.9, “Political Activity,” available at https://cdn3.cppinvestments.com/
wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CPP Investments-code-of-conduct-april-20-2020-en.pdf. The Code of Conduct,
although updated to April, 2020, still refers to CPPIB in the text, presumably because CPPIB is still the legal entity
established in by Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act.
107 Crestone’s press releases are not clear on the timing of Mr. Dey leaving the board, and Mr. Chambers and Mr.
Elgohary joining it in 2018, and so it is not clear if there were three or four CPPIB employees and nominees (Ms.
Warmbold included) on the Crestone board in 2018 when the decisions to contribute substantial funds to U.S.
election campaigns were being made.
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That is an imperfectly correct answer to the ethical questions about CPPIB using its heft, based
on the involuntary monetary contributions of millions of citizens and other people working in
Canada, to try to shape politics to support its oil and gas investments, in Colorado, even as the
Government of Canada has committed to working to transition to a low-carbon economy.

2. Acquisition of Chesapeake Oil’s Utica Shale Assets
CPPIB’s 2019 Annual Report set out the facts of this acquisition as follows:
CPPIB “[a]cquir[ed] all of Chesapeake Energy’s Utica Shale oil and gas assets in
Ohio via Encino Acquisition Partners (EAP), for US$2.0 billion. EAP was formed
in 2017 between CPPIB and Encino Energy to acquire large, high-margin
oil and gas production and development assets in the U.S. CPPIB invested
approximately US$1.0 billion in EAP and owns 98% of the partnership.” 108
While CPPIB expects to invest only in “high-margin” oil and gas production and development
assets through the EAP partnership, shale oil and gas investments are challenging even without
considering the transition and climate change aspects. First, shale oil and gas promoters are
notorious for making over-optimistic projections about future oil and gas production. An
analysis undertaken by three Wall Street Journal reporters, published in January2019, found
that “two-thirds of estimates by companies between 2014-2017 [of their projected output]
in four of U.S. ‘hottest’ areas are overoptimistic from 10% to 40%.” 109 Second, even meeting
production projections has not been enough to create profitable companies, since the industry
as a whole is characterized by (1) high levels of debt, (2) a dependence on debt and hedging
for growth, (3) years of negative free cash flow, 110 and (3) notably steep decline rates in well
productivity, constantly necessitating drilling new wells to maintain levels of production. 111 This
latter point is particularly important. A characteristic of the shale industry is that each well’s
production rate decreases steeply year-on-year. Indeed, production rates decline for a typical
shale well at 70–90% over the first three years, with much of the decline in the first year. 112 These
rates of decline means payback of well drilling costs must be achieved in the first few years.
Further, it means that if payback is not achieved, new wells must continually be drilled just to
maintain production levels and pay back the previous investors. 113

108 See CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, supra note 22, at 84.
109 Bradley Olson, Rebecca Elliott, and Christopher M. Matthews, “Fracking’s Secret Problem—Oil Wells Aren’t Producing
as Much as Forecast,” (“Fracking’s Secret Problem”), Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 2019, available at https://www.wsj.com/
articles/fracking’s-secret-problemoil-wells-arent-producing-as-much-as-forecast-11546450162.
110 An article in the Wall Street Journal in January, 2018, stated that “[s]hale gas companies spent $265 billion more
than they generated from operations since 2010.” Bradley Olson, Frackers Could Make More Money Than Ever in
2018 if They Don’t Blow It, Wall St. J. Jan. 22, 2018, available at:  https://www.wsj.com/articles/frackers-couldmake-more-money-than-ever-in-2018-if-they-dont-blow-it-1516536000.
111 Amir Azam, Reserve Base Lending and the Outlook for Shale Oil and Gas Finance (Columbia Center on Global Energy
Policy, May 2017), available at https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Reserve_Base_Lending_
Outlook_For_Shale_Oil_Gas_Finance_May2017.pdf.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid. See also Olson et al., Fracking’s Secret Problem, supra note109 (stating that “[t]he Journal’s findings suggest
current production levels may be hard to sustain without greater spending because operators need to drill more
wells to meet production targets,” yet operators are under pressure from investors to cut costs).
23

Canadian Pension Plan Fund and the Transition to a Low-carbon Economy

EAP, which is 98% owned by CPPIB, expects to avoid these types of financial losses by its hiring
of experienced Utica Shale operators from Range Resources Corporation, 114 but data from
Morningstar Research shows that Range Resources lost money five out of six quarters in 2017
and 2018. 115 So did the operator from whom EAP purchased the assets, Chesapeake Energy
Corporation. 116 How “high-margin” the assets are that CPPIB’s company purchased is thus open
to question.
EAP might avoid financial losses now because of the backing of CPPIB, however, which an
industry publication referred to as “a frequent energy investor.” 117 Encino’s COO Ray Walker,
who came out of retirement from Range Resources to join the EAP team, told the Ohio Oil and
Gas Association in March, 2019, that the company “has plans to ‘play a big role’ [in Ohio] given
CPPIB’s long-term investment strategy. ‘That’s one of the main things that really attracted
me to Encino and the whole project, is the ability look at this over multiple, multiple years,
if not decades.’” 118 CPP Investment’s long investment horizon is emphasized throughout its
investments in oil, gas, and fossil fuel infrastructure.
Current CPPIB leadership and employees on the board of EAP are:
David Chambers, Senior Principal in the Energy and Resources Group.
Michael Hill, identified on CPPIB’s website as part of the CPPIB Leadership
Team, who is a Managing Director in Energy and Resources, having joined
CPPIB in 2016, “focusing on direct private equity investment opportunities in
the Natural Resources area.” 119
3. Nephin Energy Holdings, Ltd.
As described in CPPIB’s 2018 Annual Report, CPPIB:
“signed an agreement with Shell Overseas Holdings Ltd to acquire 100% of
Shell E&P Ireland Limited, which holds Shell’s 45% interest in Corrib Natural
Gas Field in Ireland, for a total initial cash consideration of €830 million, with
additional payments of up to €250 million between 2018–2025, subject to gas
price and production.” 120

114 See Jamison Cocklin, Encino Plans ‘Big Role’ in Ohio as Work Begins on New Utica Portfolio, Natural Gas Intelligence
(March 8, 2019), available at www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/117657-encino-plans-big-role-in-ohio-as-workbegins-on-new-utica-portfolio.
115 See Clark Williams-Derry, Kathy Hipple & Tom Sanzillo, IEEFA and Sightline Institute, Energy Market Update; Red
Flags on US Fracking Disappointing Financial Performance Continues, Oct. 2018, available at http://ieefa.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Red-Flags-on-U.S.-Fracking_October-2018.pdf (analysis based on financial data
compiled from Morningstar Research).
116 Ibid.
117 See Cocklin, supra note 114 (writing that Houston-based Encino Energy LLC “formed Encino Acquisition Partners in
2017 to acquire and operate the Ohio asset with the backing of a frequent energy investor, the Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board.”).
118 Cocklin, supra note 114, quoting COO Ray Walker on why he came out of retirement from “Appalachian heavyweight
Range Resources Corp.” to join EAP.
119 See CPPIB Website, Our Leadership Team, Biography of Michael Hill, available at https://www.cppinvestments.
com/about-us/our-leadership/leadership-team.
120 See CPPIB 2018 Annual Report, supra note 120, at 66.
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This transaction was organized through Nephin Energy Holdings, Ltd., described as
CPPIB’s “wholly-owned, indirect subsidiary” by Irish competition authorities approving the
transaction. 121 It was also described as Energy and Resource’s “first European acquisition” in
CPPIB’s 2019 Annual Report. 122
The Competition Commission stated as follows about the rationale for the transaction, taken
from the parties’ submissions:
The Proposed Transaction represents the exit of Shell from the upstream gas
sector in Ireland. The sale of SEPIL [Shell E&P Ireland Ltd.] with the associated
45% interest in the Corrib Field is part of Shell’s current three –year $30 billion
divestment programme worldwide. . . .
As a result of the Proposed Transaction, CPPIB hopes to further its strategy of
investing in high-quality natural resources assets alongside highly regarded
and experienced operating partners such as [Canadian company] Vermilion.
Vermilion has a strong operational track record in both onshore and offshore
projects. The Corrib Field fits with CPPIB’s strategy to make direct, long-term
investments in top tier assets. Natural resources are an attractive sector for
CPPIB because it believes that investments in this sector deliver strong risk
adjusted returns over the long-term time horizon of the CPP Fund. 123
Shell’s press release announcing the transaction on July 12, 2017, indicated that “the Shell
share of the Corrib gas venture’s production represented approximately 27,000 barrels of oil
equivalent/day.” 124 Press reports at the time the transaction was completed, November 30,
2018, also mentioned another aspect of Shell’s divestment: that it ends Shell’s “involvement in
the most controversial infrastructure project in the history of the [Irish] State. . . .Discovered 21
years ago, the Corrib gas field was dogged by years of opposition before natural gas started to
flow from the field in December 2015.” 125
Nephin Energy, created by CPPIB, is now Ireland’s largest producer of natural gas, according to
its website. 126 The Nephin Energy board includes: 127
David Chambers, Senior Principal in the Energy and Resources Group.
Michael Hill, identified on CPPIB’s website as part of the CPPIB Leadership
Team, who is a Managing Director in Energy and Resources, having joined
CPPIB in 2016.
Megan Hansen, Principal in the Energy and Resources Group.

121 See Competition and Consumer Protection Committee (Ireland)(“Competition Determination”), Determination of
Merger Notification M/18/061 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board/Shell E&P Ireland, Ltd., 5 September 2018,
available at https://www.ccpc.ie/business/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/08/M-18-061-DeterminationCPPIB-SEPIL.pdf.
122 See CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, supra note 22, at 84.
123 Competition Determineation, supra note 121, at 4.
124 Shell, Press Release, Shell to divest Upstream interests in Ireland for up to $1.23 billion, July 12, 2017, available at
https://www.shell.com/media/news-and-media-releases/2017/shell-to-divest-upstream-interests-in-ireland.
html.  
125 Colin Gleeson, Shell counting the cost as sale of Corrib gas field completed, Irish Times, Nov. 30, 2018, available at
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/energy-and-resources/shell-counting-the-cost-as-sale-of-corrib-gasfield-completed-1.3715864.
126 See Nephin Energy Website, available at www.nephinenergy.com.
127 See Nephin Energy Website, Board of Directors, available at https://www.nephinenergy.com/board-of-directors.
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4. Teine Energy
The outline of CPPIB’s relationship with Teine Energy is described in CPPIB’s 2017 Annual Report
as a “notable transaction” as follows:
“Natural Resources invested additional equity into Teine Energy Ltd. to
support Teine’s acquisition of Penn West Petroleum’s oil and gas assets in
Saskatchewan for $975 million. Since 2010, we have invested approximately
$1.3 billion in Teine and hold approximately 90% of the company on a fully
diluted basis.” 128
Teine’s website describes the company as follows:
“Teine Energy Ltd. (Teine) is a privately-held company focused on investing
in low-risk, geographically concentrated conventional oil assets through a
strategic partnership with Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB).
We are the largest producer in the Saskatchewan Viking play with more than
5,000 low-risk, repeatable drilling locations identified on our 800,000 net acres
of land. This represents over 15 years of drilling at current activity levels and
positions Teine to continue expanding profitability through efficiencies in cost
structure, increasing well productivity, and improved reservoir recovery. Our
Saskatchewan Bakken heavy oil position is a low viscosity oil ideally suited for
water and polymer flooding, providing low decline production with minimal
maintenance capital requirements.” 129
A chart on the same page shows the barrel of oil equivalents per day (BOE/D) increasing by
about 30% per year since 2011 (soon after CPPIB began supporting the company to lease the
land), and is by today 28,483. 130 The website further states that to date only about 2% of the oil
projected to be in the ground in the Viking “play” has been recovered, and so a continuing 15
years of further productivity is expected from that asset. 131 Regarding the Bakken heavy oil, we
learn that about 7,000 BOE/D of the 28,483 stated is from the Bakken region, that 98% of the
region is under water, and that a “polymer flood pilot is achieving positive response,” with the
potential to expand throughout the region. 132 As with each of the private companies this Report
has discussed, Teine Energy emphasizes the importance of its financial backing from CPPIB, as
indicated in the first sentence of the quote above, from the first page of its website.
Current CPPIB leadership and employees on the board of Teine Energy are:
		

David Chambers, Senior Principal in the Energy and Resources Group.

		

Avik Dey, Managing Director, Head of Energy and Resources Group.

128 CPPIB, 2017 Annual Report, p. 60, available at https://cdn4.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/04/2017_Annual_Report-1.pdf.
129 See Teine Energy Website, Corporate Profile, available at https://www.teine-energy.com/about/corporate-profile.
html.  
130 Ibid.
131 See Teine Energy Website, Operations, available at https://www.teine-energy.com/operations.
132 Ibid.
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A former top executive of CPPIB is also on the board of Teine Energy:
Nicolas Zelenczuk: His experience at CPPIB is described as follows on the Teine
Energy website. “Mr. Zelenczuk has served on Teine’s Board of Directors since
2012. From 2013 to May 2018 he was the Senior Managing Director and Chief
Operations Officer for the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB).
Prior to that he was the Chief Financial Officer for CPPIB for 4 years.” 133
5. Williams Ohio Valley Midstream
What seems to be CPP Investment’s most recent foray into U.S. shale oil was its investment in
Williams Ohio Valley Midstream. In the 2020 Annual Report, the transaction was described as
follows:
“[E&R] Closed the formation of a US$3.8 billion joint venture with The Williams
Companies, Inc. The joint venture includes Williams’ 100% owned Ohio Valley
Midstream system and 100% of the Utica East Ohio Midstream LLC system.
E&R invested US$1.3 billion for a 35% ownership stake in the joint venture
with Williams retaining a 65% interest.” 134
The project is described as follows on CPP Investment’s website:
Ohio Valley Midstream JV includes 100% of both the Utica East Ohio and Ohio
Valley Midstream systems, which provide natural gas gathering, processing
and fractionation services in Ohio, West Virginia and Pennsylvania.
Williams is a premier provider of large-scale infrastructure connecting U.S.
natural gas and natural gas products to growing demand for cleaner fuel
and feedstocks. Headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Williams is an industryleading, investment grade C-Corp with operations across the natural gas value
chain including gathering, processing, interstate transportation and storage
of natural gas and natural gas liquids. With major positions in top U.S. supply
basins, Williams owns and operates more than 30,000 miles of pipelines
system wide and handles approximately 30 percent of U.S. natural gas. 135

6. Wolf Midstream
The major outlines of CPPIB’s creation of Wolf Midstream are set out as follows, quoting CPPIB’s
Annual Reports.
2017: In fiscal 2016, Wolf Infrastructure, the Natural Resources (NR) group’s
first platform investment [of $1.0 billion], was established as a midstream
energy infrastructure investment focused on opportunities in Western
Canada. In fiscal 2017, Wolf closed its first acquisition of a 50% ownership

133 See Teine Energy Website, About Us, available at https://www.teine-energy.com/about/ (members of the board
listed including David Chambers, Avik Dey, and Nicholas Zelenczuk).
134 CPP Inv. 2020 Annual Report, supra note 3, at 89.
135 See CPP Investments, Real Assets, Energy and Resources, available at https://www.cppinvestments.com/thefund/our-investments/investment-real-assets.
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interest in Access Pipeline from Devon Energy Corp for $1.4 billion with an
equity investment of $683 million from CPPIB. The Access Pipeline system
includes pipelines that transport blended bitumen and diluent within
Alberta. This is a strategic cornerstone asset for the Wolf vehicle from which
management expects to build a broader midstream business over time. 136
The 2018 Annual Report notes that an additional $703 million was invested in Wolf Midstream. 137
The 2019 Annual Report describes additional investments in Wolf Midstream as a “notable”
Energy and Resources transaction as follows:
Entering into a long-term service agreement for the construction and
operation of the Alberta Carbon Trunk Line via Wolf Midstream, which is 99%
owned by CPPIB. CPPIB invested approximately C$300 million in the project. 138
From the portions quoted, we can see $2.686 billion being invested in creating a company 99%
owned by CPP, Wolf Midstream. Wolf is now the 100% owner of the Access Pipeline in Alberta,
which transports oil sands bitumen to two major storage facilities, the Sturgeon and Stonefell
Terminals. 139
That this investment is important in expanding oil sands production and transport in Alberta
was emphasized in this quote by Wolf’s CEO, Gord Salahor:
As the Access owner and Operator, Wolf now has a tremendous opportunity to
expand Access Pipeline’s capacity for bitumen blend and diluent to serve both
MEG and Devon as well as third parties. We are pleased that this transaction
has positioned MEG as an anchor tenant for solvent service on the unutilized
Access 16-inch pipeline and prompted additional interest among both natural
gas liquids suppliers and oil sands producers. 140
Another of Wolf Midstream’s investments is in carbon capture and storage, the Alberta Carbon
Trunk Line (“ACTL”). CPP Investments put $300 million into that specific project of Wolf
Infrastructure. 141 The ACTL is described as follows on Wolf’s website:
Wolf is the owner and operator of the system’s compression facilities at two
independent capture sites, as well as the 240-kilometre ACTL pipeline that
safely transports CO2 from the capture sites to mature oil fields in Central
Alberta for secure storage and enhanced oil recovery (EOR) projects. . . .
Designed as the backbone infrastructure needed to support Alberta’s lower
carbon transition, ACTL is capable of transporting up to 14.6 million tonnes

136 CPPIB 2017 Annual Report, supra note 128, at 59. A “platform investment” is described as “an investment vehicle,
which allows us to achieve scale in a defined market or geography, by leveraging the investment’s management
expertise (e.g., deal origination or execution, specialized expertise, relationships), in the most resource efficient
manner.” Ibid.
137 CPPIB 2018 Annual Report, supra note 67, at 65.
138 CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, supra note 22, at 84.
139 See Wolf Midstream Website, Our Operations, available at https://www.wolfmidstream.com/operations/. See also
Wolf Midstream Press Release, Wolf Midstream Completes Acquisition of Remaining 50% Interest in Access Pipeline,
March 22, 2018, available at https://www.wolfmidstream.com/wolf-midstream-completes-acquisition-ofremaining-50-interest-in-access-pipeline/.
140 Wolf Midstream Press Release, supra note 139.
141 See CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, supra note 22, at 84.
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of CO2 per year. This represents approximately 20% of all current oil sands
emissions or equal to the impact of capturing the CO2 from more than 2.6
million cars in Alberta. 142
Although designed to handle that much carbon, the website also indicates it has unused
capacity at this point, August 31, 2020. 143
While this use of CO2 will increase light oil recovery from “mature oilfields,” it will also capture
carbon from industrial facilities in Alberta, and thus contribute to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. How those emissions reductions compare to the emissions from the expanded oil
sands development allowed by the Access pipeline is not clear. Moreover, CPP’s contribution to
the ACTL was $300 million, 144 versus its $2.3 billion investment developing Wolf and providing
capital for Wolf to purchase the Access pipeline. In other words, its investment in carbon
reductions was 13% of its investment in expanded oil sands production. It is not surprising that
the CEO of CPP Investments, Mark Machin, emphasized CPP’s investment in the ACTL in a recent
op ed on the importance of taking climate change seriously. 145 By not mentioning CPPIB/CPP
Investment’s far more substantial role in establishing Wolf Midstream and giving it the capital
to also purchase the Access pipeline, his statement does not convey an accurate view of CPP
Investment’s activities in the oil sands through this company, however.
The following current CPPIB leadership and employees are on the board of Wolf Midstream:
Michael Hill, who is a Managing Director in Energy and Resources, having
joined CPPIB in 2016, “focusing on direct private equity investment
opportunities in the Natural Resources area.” 146
Robert Mellema, is described as follows on Wolf’s website: “Robert Mellema is a Senior Principal
in the Natural Resources Group at the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB),
based in Toronto. Since joining CPPIB in 2008, he has been involved in evaluating investment
opportunities across a broad range of sectors including financial services, building products,
business services, hospitality and consumer products as a member of the Direct Private Equity
Group. Since dedicating his time more fully to Natural Resources, Robert has played an integral
role in many important CPPIB natural resources investments in upstream oil and gas and
energy infrastructure including Teine Energy, Seven Generation Energy, Black Swan Energy and
Wolf Midstream. He is a member of CPPIB’s Sustainable Investing Committee . . .” 147

142 Ibid., Alberta Carbon Trunk Line, available at https://www.wolfmidstream.com/ab-carbon-tl/.
143 Ibid.
144 See CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, supra note 22, at 84.
145 See Mark Machin, There is a crisis beyond COVID-19 that we can’t afford to ignore: climate change, Toronto Star Aug.
22, 2020, available at https://www.thestar.com/business/opinion/2020/08/22/there-is-a-crisis-beyond-covid-19that-we-cant-afford-to-ignore-climate-change.html.
146 See CPP Investments Website, Our Leadership Team, Biography of Michael Hill, available at https://www.
cppinvestments.com/about-us/our-leadership/leadership-team.
147 Wolf Midstream website, Biography of Directors, Robert Mellema, available at https://www.wolfmidstream.com/
about-wolf/board-of-directors/ (last visited August 31, 2020).
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D. Summary
There is much of concern in this pattern of investments from a climate change perspective.
These are all investments in expanding fossil fuel technologies and producing more oil and gas
at a time when every scientifically credible analysis shows the world needs to be transitioning
away from oil and gas. CPPIB could use its decades-long investment horizon, and its substantial
secure funding from the Canadian public, both of which it emphasizes in announcing these
transactions and in its annual reports, 148 to be a “platform investor” in the transition to a
low-carbon economy. It is not subject to short-term pressures from capital markets, as it also
emphasizes, and so could support newer, riskier technologies and research. It could invest its
patient capital in bringing new technologies to market and supporting the necessary scaling
up of existing renewable and storage technologies. It could be a leader in supporting transition
strategies and innovative approaches to business. Instead what we see is increasing support for
renewables, to be sure, but also doubling down on oil and gas, a sector to which the Canadian
economy is already substantially over-exposed. This choice presents lost opportunities at a time
when a transition to a low-carbon economy is a global, and Canadian, imperative. It is a choice,
moreover, fraught with legal risk. It is to that topic that this analysis now turns.

148 There are frequent references throughout CPPIB’s Annual Reports to its advantages as an investor: its scale, certainty
of assets given contributors’ required payments, and long investment horizon. The following language from the
opening pages of the 2015 Annual Report is typical: “The certainty of cash inflows from contributions means we can
be flexible, patient investors able to take advantage of opportunities in volatile markets when others face liquidity
pressures. . . .[O]ur exceptionally long investment horizon is an increasingly important competitive strength. We
can assess and pursue opportunities differently and stay the course when many cannot. Further, CPPIB’s long-term
perspective makes patient capital available for direct commitments that can create value for the Fund over many
years to come.” CPPIB 2015 Annual Report, at 2, available at https://cdn3.cppinvestments.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/09/CPPIB_F2015_AR_ENG_May_21_2015_JSyvEY0.pdf . See also CPPIB 2016 Annual Report, supra
note 75, at 2.

30

Canadian Pension Plan Fund and the Transition to a Low-carbon Economy

V. The Legal Risks of the CPPIB Approach
A number of questions about CPPIB’s strategies have been raised throughout this Report. The
over-arching policy question is whether public pension funds such as CPP do have, or should
have, responsibilities in their home country to support the transition to a low-carbon future, in
light of the climate imperative and government policies recognizing that imperative.
There are a number of legal considerations that could inform answers to that policy question.
As a fiduciary, CPP Investments has fiduciary obligations to its current and future pension
beneficiaries, based on both common-law fiduciary standards, 149 and its statutory obligations.
We’ll start with a discussion of CPPIB’s statutory obligations.

A. CPPIB’s Statutory Mandate
The statute that established CPPIB to manage the Canadian Pension Plan’s assets, the Canada
Pension Plan Investment Act, defines CPPIB’s mandate as follows:
Section 5: Objects and Powers
The objects of the Board are:
(f) To assist the Canada Pension Plan in meeting its obligations to contributors and
beneficiaries under the Canada Pension Plan;
(g) To manage any amounts transferred to it under sections 108.1 and 108.3 of the
Canada Pension Plan, and its right, title or interest in any designated securities, in
the best interests of the contributors and beneficiaries under that Act; and
(h) To invest its assets with a view to achieving a maximum rate of return, without
undue risk of loss, having regard to the factors that may affect the funding of
the Canada Pension Plan and the ability of the Canada Pension Plan to meet its
financial obligations on any given business day. 150
CPPIB’s understanding of its mandate is clear: “CPPIB invests the assets of the CPP with a
singular objective – to maximize returns without undue risk of loss taking into account the
factors that may affect the funding of the CPP.” 151 Yet, as the statutory language indicates, CPPIB
has a dual mandate. Its investment mandate is set out in section 5(c), but the statute also
includes a management mandate in section 5(b), which is to “manage [the CPP assets] in the
best interests of the contributors and beneficiaries” to the Canada Pension Plan.

149 Excellent discussions of pension trustees’ fiduciary duties in Canada can be found in Murray Gold & Adrian
Scotchmer, Climate Change and the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Trustees in Canada (2015) and Janis Sarra,
Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment: Implications of Climate Change (2018), available at https://ccli.
ubc.ca/.
150 Canada Pension Plan Investment Act, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-8.3/, § 5 (2019).
151 See CPPIB, How we Invest, available at http://www.cppib.com/en/how-we-invest, quoting Canada Pension Plan
Investment Act, supra note 370, § 5(c).
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By the plain language of the statute, Section 5(b) sets out a broader duty than the Section 5(c)
investment mandate, particularly given the use of the plural term “the best interests of the
contributors and beneficiaries.” A statutory interpretation that collapses “the best interests of
the contributors and beneficiaries” into the investment mandate of Section 5(c) renders Section
5(b) meaningless, which is inconsistent with core principles of statutory interpretation. Those
“best interests” today must include the need for investing consistent with the Government’s
commitments to the Paris Agreement, at the least, and probably even investing consistent with
its more recent commitment to net zero emissions by 2050.
What is missing in most of CPPIB’s public communications is some recognition that as a large,
patient-capital investor of the public’s money, CPPIB has the potential to shape the future
that its contributors and beneficiaries will retire into. Its CEO has recognized that potential in
2020, and we welcome his partnership in thinking carefully about how that should be done. 152
Certainly, CPP Investments has that potential in Canada. It will be shaping that future badly, by
default, without a more thorough-going appreciation for how it is—or isn’t—contributing to the
transition to a low-carbon economy.
There are financial institutions and pension funds of a comparable size that understand
their responsibilities far differently than CPPIB. In adopting a systematic, firm-wide, global
sustainability approach to managing the € 436 billion of assets on behalf of its clients, BNP
Paribas Asset Management (BNPP AM) stated as follows:
BNPP AM’s approach is also fully in line with the [BNP Paribas] Group’s
leadership on sustainable finance. The Group aims in particular to finance
the economy in an ethical way, promote the development of its employees,
support initiatives with a social impact and play a major role in the transition
toward a low carbon economy. It thereby wants to be a major contributor to
the UN Sustainable Development Goals. 153
Similarly, ABP, the large (€ 456 billion) Dutch pension plan for 2.9 million government
employees and retirees, stated as follows about its responsibilities as it updated its sustainable
and responsible investment policy in 2015:
As a pension fund, good investment returns are crucial to us if we are to fulfil
our current and future pension commitments. We focus on controlling costs
and managing risks associated with investment. But our responsibilities do
not end there. One out of six Dutch citizens is currently either receiving or
accruing pensions via ABP. Our size makes us an important player in the Dutch
economy and the wider society. It brings with it a huge responsibility for the
long term, too. This responsibility is not only financial, it is also societal. We
believe it is important to generate our returns sustainably and responsibly. We
want to contribute to a more sustainable economy that respects people and
the environment. 154

152 See text accompanying note 2, supra, quoting CEO and Chair of CPP Investments Mark Machin.
153 Press Release, BNP Paribas Asset Management, BNP Paribas Asset Management takes a step further in its
commitment to sustainable investment and launches ambitious, firm-wide sustainability strategy, March 20,
2019, available at: https://group.bnpparibas/en/press-release/bnp-paribas-asset-management-takes-stepcommitment-sustainable-investment-launches-ambitious-firm-wide-sustainability-strategy (emphasis
supplied).
154 ABP, ABP’s Approach to Societal Considerations as part of in Responsible Investment, 1 (2017), available at https://
www.abp.nl/images/Position_Paper_EngSocConFinal.pdf.
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As part of its contributions to shaping the world of the future, APB stated that:
Another aim of our new [as of 2015] policy is to invest a greater portion of our
assets in activities that actually contribute to solutions to sustainability issues.
Our experience as an investor has taught us that generating an attractive
financial return can be compatible with working on solutions to social issues.
For several years, we have been actively seeking investments that combine
both goals. By early 2015, already we invested €29 billion in these types of
investments. [By 2016, € 41 billion had been so invested.] 155 Specifically, this
relates to investments in activities that contribute to solutions to social and
environmental issues such as climate change, water shortages, flooding, air
pollution, loss of natural habitats, the extinction of species and the need for
micro-financing. Investments in pharmaceutical companies that contribute
to accessible health care in countries with a low average income are also
included in this category. 156
Specifically regarding climate change, ABP had also committed, in 2015, to reduce the
greenhouse-gas emissions of its portfolios by 25% by 2020. 157 That goal was well underway by
2016, with reductions of 16%. 158 Those reductions were part of a suite of actions ABP is taking
regarding climate change, because it perceives its responsibilities as follows:
Pension funds have a responsibility with regard to combating climate change,
not least because climate change can have a huge impact on the value of their
investments but also, especially, because they have to take a longer view.
Our youngest participants will not be drawing their pensions until the closing
decades of this century. We want them to be able to enjoy retirement in a
world that is still a pleasant place to live. To help in ensuring that this is so, we
need everything to be done in order to restrict global warming to well below
2°C and to attempt to limit the rise to 1.5°C. In addition, we as a pension fund
invest in such a way as to contribute to the sustainability of the planet. 159
CPP Investments is increasing its investments in one important area of the transition to a lowcarbon economy, and that is renewable energy, specifically wind and solar energy. Outside of
renewable energy, however, there is little evidence of it having any ambitions comparable to
ABP or BNP Paribas AM to shape the future into which its current contributors will retire. It is
instead interpreting the “best interests of its contributors and beneficiaries” in purely financial
terms. That approach leads to a second series of questions: is an investor of CPP’s public heft
meeting its fiduciary responsibilities by adopting a business-as-usual approach in light of the
climate imperative?

155 See Sarra, supra note 149, at 64.
156 ABP, supra note 154, at 3.
157 ABP, ABP’s Approach to Climate Change and Energy Investments, 3, available at https://www.abp.nl/images/
ABP_on_climate_change.pdf.
158 See Sarra, supra note 370, at 64, citing ABP, Pensioenfonds voor overheid en onderwijs, “ABP on course with
sustainable investments”, 8 May 2017, available at https://www.abp.nl/images/press-release-sustainable-andresponsible-investment-report-2016.pdf.
159 See ABP, supra note 154, at 1.
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B. CPPIB’s Fiduciary Obligations
The common-law fiduciary duties of pension trustees are to act according to the duties of
prudence (care) and loyalty. 160 There is also a developing understanding that pension fiduciaries
have a duty of impartiality to act fairly between generations, so not to prioritize short-term
investment benefits at the expense of longer-term risks and liabilities. 161 The duty of prudence
requires trustees and their delegated agents to make decisions on an informed basis, after
reasonable investigation. 162 The duty of loyalty requires actions in good faith, in the best interest
of the fund and its beneficiaries, and avoiding conflicts of interest. 163 These duties have been
directly incorporated into the statute that established the CPPIB, the Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board Act (“CPPIB Act”) as follows:
Section 14: Duty of Care
(14)(1) Every director and officer of the Board in exercising any of the powers of a
director or an officer and in discharging any of the duties of a director or an officer shall:
(i) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the Board;
and
( j) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in comparable circumstances. 164
These same duties apply to CPPIB’s employees, by virtue of their legal position as agents of the
board, and by the CPPIB Act:
Section 15: Duty to comply
15(1) Every director, officer and employee of the Board shall comply with this
Act and the by-laws.
CPPIB’s Annual Reports and other communications make clear that it is a careful manager of
this very large pool of public assets, using sophisticated risk management across the entire
portfolio. 165 Its Responsible Investment materials indicate awareness of the increased risks of
climate change. 166

160 Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 SCR 377, at 419.
161 See James Hawley, Keith Johnson, and Ed Waitzer, Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty Balance, 4:2 Rotman Int’l J. of Pension
Mngmt. 4-17 (2011)(discussing pension funds’ intergenerational duty of impartiality).
162 See Gold & Scotchmer, supra note 149, at 10; Sarra, supra note 149, at 52.
163 Ibid.
164 Although this statutory section is entitled the “duty of care,” section 14(a)(1) is the statutory articulation of the
common-law duty of loyalty, and section 14(a)(2) is the duty of care.  The same language as applied to incorporated
entities in Section 122(a)(1) & (2) of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) was construed by the Supreme
Court of Canada as follows: “The first duty has been referred to in this case as the ‘fiduciary duty’. It is better
described as the ‘duty of loyalty’. . . .  This duty requires directors and officers to act honestly and in good faith with a
view to the best interests of the corporation. The second duty is commonly referred to as the ‘duty of care’. Generally
speaking, it imposes a legal obligation upon directors and officers to be diligent in supervising and managing the
corporation’s affairs.” Peoples v. Wise, [2004] 3 SCR 461, para. 32.  
165 See CPPIB 2019 Annual Report, supra note 22, at 46-51 (discussing CPPIB’s risk management framework).
166 CPPIB, 2019 Report on Sustainable Investment: Climate Change, 1-3, available at http://www.cppib.com/
documents/2131/Climate_Change_Brochure.pdf.
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It also states that it aims to be:
“a leader among asset owners and managers in understanding the investment
risks and opportunities presented by climate change. This aligns with our
legislative mandate, recognizing we must act in the best interests of current
and future beneficiaries. Investments and assets must be properly priced to
reflect risks and offer sufficiently attractive potential returns. 167
Yet, the facts discussed in this Report give rise to a number of questions about whether CPP
Investment’s stated approach to climate change in 2020 is being incorporated in a thoroughgoing manner, across all of its asset classes, consistent with a large, public pension fund’s
fiduciary duties. There are a number of reasons to be concerned.
First, with respect to its public equities investments in Canada, Mercer’s analysis discussed
above168 suggests that an active investor such as CPP Investments, invested in a businessas-usual, diversified equity portfolio that is not sustainability themed, 169 and with significant
oil, gas, and coal holdings, risks “undue loss,” indeed catastrophic loss in some asset classes,
starting to eventuate over the next eleven years. Thus, given that analysis, and other similar
findings, 170 CPPIB needs to explain how it could be meeting either its statutory mandate, or
its fiduciary duties under statutory and common law, by maintaining its business-as-usual
approach to those investments.
Second, of greater concern is the “doubling-down” on oil and gas through CPPIB’s
establishment and substantial funding of new companies to engage in fracking in the U.S.,
to support oil and gas development in Saskatchewan and Alberta, and to take on additional
off-shore oil and gas commitments off the coast of Ireland. Given how exposed the Canadian
economy is to the oil and gas industry, adding investments in these areas is both risky, and
difficult to square with fiduciary obligations of prudence. These private company investments
also give rise to the troubling questions of potential conflicts of interest discussed above.
Third, the political contributions of Crestone Peak Resources are deeply troubling. If
investigations were to show that the $607,000 that was contributed to U.S. elections came in
any way from CPPIB itself, rather than from the operating income of Crestone itself (given that
many of its wells were not operating in 2018 due to on-going litigation and restrictions), that

167 Ibid.
168 See supra footnote 42,
169 There is nothing in CPPIB’s 2019 Annual Report, or CPP Investment’s 2020 Annual Report, to suggest that its
substantial public equity holdings are being invested with a sustainability theme. Rather, its description of its
Sustainable Investment approach emphasizes engagement over divestment; and using proxy voting power
and other engagement strategies to encourage better disclosure from the companies that it holds. That said,
incorporating climate change as a material financial risk is recognized by CPPIB, see CPPIB 2019 Annual Report,
supra note 22, at 28, 40, 73, inter alia, and it states that it has just begun to add climate risk analysis to CPPIB’s direct
private equity investments. Ibid. at 40. Thus, it could be that these substantial financial risks from holding public
equity portfolios that are not sustainability themed, in conjunction with significant oil, gas, and coal holdings, will
be ameliorated over time, but time is at a premium given the state of the climate imperative. And note that Mercer’s
analysis shows overwhelming losses to oil, gas, and coal investments to 2030.  
170 See, e.g., BNP Paribas Asset Management, Wells, Wires, and Wheels: EROCI (Energy Recovered on Capital
Investment) and the Tough Road Ahead for Oil, Aug. 2019, available at https://docfinder.bnpparibas-am.com/
api/files/1094E5B9-2FAA-47A3-805D-EF65EAD09A7F (calculating EROCI of oil versus renewables over the next
25 years for powering transportation, and finding that the combination of new solar or wind and electric vehicles
will produce 6x to 7x the energy for powering light-duty vehicles, compared with oil powering internal combustion
engines; and further calculating that to be cost competitive over the next twenty-five years oil must be sold at about
$10/barrel).
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would be both embarrassing and illegal. Even if not illegal, at the time the contributions were
made CPPIB employees made up a majority of the Crestone board, as described above. Does
CPPIB think that this kind of electoral involvement in another country is acceptable? Would
most Canadians think it was acceptable?
Finally, fiduciary obligations are not static, but evolve with changing understandings of financial
(and other) risks and opportunities. Does such a fiduciary as CPP Investments have heightened
responsibilities in 2020, given its size, its captive contributors, its long-term obligations, and the
climate imperative? Thoughtful analyses of pension funds’ fiduciary obligations would suggest
yes. 171

XI. Conclusion: A Positive Role for
CPP Investments and the Fund
Over the past months, a number of promising studies have been published showing significant
economic and environmental opportunities in Canada from investments in a circular economy,
and investments in a resilient recovery from the covid-19 lock-down. Circular economy
opportunities span the economy, from agriculture and food production, automotives,
construction, electronics, forestry, minerals and metals, plastics and used oil. 172 The Task Force
for a Resilient Recovery has published a preliminary report with specific ideas for investments in
innovations in buildings, zero-emissions vehicles and infrastructure, energy, nature, and clean
competitiveness. 173 A report entitled Building Back Better with a Bold Green Recovery similarly
has compiled ideas for supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy that identifies
significant investment opportunities. 174 These are all resources identifying areas where CPP
Investment’s financial sophistication and assets could well be brought to bear in service of
developing new opportunities while supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy
We invite CPP Investments to engage with contributors to and beneficiaries of CPP in a
thoughtful, careful discussion of what its responsibilities are to support the government’s
transition policies. CPP Investment’ contributions to the future that Canada needs could be
profitable, could unlock purely private capital through de-risking and co-investment strategies,
and could provide the kinds of venture capital long missing in the Canadian economy. We urge
it to take seriously its power to reshape the Canadian economy for the good.

171 See, e.g., among others, Doug Sarro & Ed Waitzer, Fiduciary Society Unleashed: The Road Ahead for the Financial
Sector, 69:4 Bus. Lawyer 1081, 1093 (2014); Gold & Scotchmer, supra note 149; Sarra, supra note 149.
172 See Smart Prosperity Institute, Driving a Circular Economic Transition—Policy and Innovation Approaches, available
at https://institute.smartprosperity.ca/sites/default/files/5-driving-circular-economy-transition-policy-andinnovation-approaches.pdf.
173 See Task Force for a Resilient Recovery, Preliminary Report of the Task Force for a Resilient Recovery, July 22, 2020,
available at https://www.recoverytaskforce.ca/.
174 See Ralph Torrie, Cé́line Bak & Toby Heaps, Building Back Better with a Bold Green Recovery, June 2020, available
at https://www.corporateknights.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Building-Back-Better-with-a-Bold-GreenRecovery_2020-1.pdf.
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